

WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE

REALISM, LIBERALISM, AND SOCIALISM

Michael W. Doyle



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to Amy Gutmann,
who inspired my effort to build a bridge between international politics
and political philosophy and whose advice and
affection sustained me along the way

through logrolling and least common denominators different too from individual interests. Democratic capitalism means free trade and a peaceful foreign policy simply because they are, Schumpeter claims, the first best solutions for rational majorities in capitalist societies.

The contrast between Locke and Schumpeter thus emerges as the contrast between First and Second Image Liberals. Schumpeter makes the peace, which is a duty of the Lockean Liberal statesman, into the structured outcome of capitalist democracy. Both highlight for us powerful elements of Liberal world politics. But if there is a long state of peace between Liberal republics, Locke offers us a weak explanation for it. (How do they avoid partiality and bias so regularly in these relations?) He also misses the persistent state of war between Liberals and non-Liberals. (Why are the Liberals so regularly more partial here?) Schumpeter misses the Liberal sources of war with non-Liberals, unless we should blame all these wars on the non-Liberals.

Kant and the Liberal internationalists try, as we see next, to fill these gaps as they illustrate for us the larger potential of the Liberal tradition.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Internationalism: Kant

It can be shown that this idea of federalism, extending gradually to encompass all states and thus leading to perpetual peace, is practicable and has objective reality. For if by good fortune one powerful and enlightened nation can form a republic (which is by nature inclined to seek perpetual peace), this will provide a focal point for federal association among other states. These will join up with the first one, thus securing the freedom of each state in accordance with the idea of international right, and the whole will gradually spread further and further by a series of alliances of this kind.

—Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace"¹

WHAT DIFFERENCE DO Liberal principles and institutions make to the conduct of the foreign affairs of Liberal states? Despite the contributions of Locke and the Institutionalists, on the one hand, and Smith and the commercial pacifists, on the other, a thicket of conflicting judgments suggests that the legacies of Liberalism have not been clearly appreciated. For many citizens of Liberal states, Liberal principles and institutions have so fully absorbed domestic politics that their influence on foreign affairs tends to be either overlooked altogether or, when perceived, exaggerated. Liberalism becomes either unself-consciously patriotic or inherently "peace-loving." For many scholars and diplomats, the relations among independent states appear to differ so significantly from domestic politics that influences of Liberal principles and domestic Lib-

¹ Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace," *Kant's Political Writings* (1795), trans H. B. Nisbet and ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 104.

eral institutions are denied or denigrated. They judge that international relations are governed by perceptions of national security and the balance of power; Liberal principles and institutions, when they do intrude, confuse and disrupt the pursuit of balance of power politics.

Although Liberalism is misinterpreted from both these points of view, a crucial aspect of the Liberal legacy is captured by each. Liberalism is a distinct ideology and set of institutions that have shaped the perceptions of and capacities for foreign relations of political societies that range from social welfare or social democratic to laissez-faire. It defines much of the content of the Liberal patriot's nationalism. Liberalism does appear to disrupt the pursuit of balance of power politics. Thus its foreign relations cannot be adequately explained (or prescribed) by a sole reliance on the balance of power. But contrary to the pacifists, Liberalism is not inherently "peace-loving," nor is it consistently restrained or peaceful in intent. Furthermore, Liberal practice may reduce the probability that states will successfully exercise the consistent restraint and peaceful intentions that a world peace may well require in the nuclear age. Yet the peaceful intent and restraint that Liberalism does manifest in limited aspects of its foreign affairs announce the possibility of a world peace this side of the grave or of world conquest. Liberals, contrary to the Institutionalists, have created something considerably more stable than a troubled peace constantly threatening an outbreak of war. They have strengthened the prospects for a world peace established by the steady expansion of a separate peace among Liberal societies.

This chapter highlights the differences between Liberal practice toward other Liberal societies and Liberal practice toward non-Liberal societies. It argues that Liberalism has achieved extraordinary success in the first and has contributed to exceptional confusion in the second. Appreciating these Liberal legacies calls, first, for another look at one of the greatest of Liberal philosophers, Immanuel Kant, for he is a source of insight, policy, and hope.

IMMANUEL KANT

Just as Locke is the theorist of individualist (Image I) statesmanship, and the commercial pacifists of societal (Image II) forces, Kant is the Liberal theorist of international interaction (Image III), distinguishing outcomes by differences in interaction. He highlights how the interacting pair (dyad) makes for outcomes that cannot be predicted by a dispositional analysis of the foreign policies of Liberal states. Peace holds only in the interaction between Liberals, he argues, not in relations between Liberals and non-Liberals. The peace they enjoy is, moreover, a state of peace, not merely successful deterrence or an absence of opportunity for war.

Kant

Human Nature	x
Domestic Society	x
Interstate System	xx

His life (1724–1804) gave little inclination of the revolution he was to ignite in the tradition of philosophy in the West. Born in Königsberg, a subject of Prussia, the son of a poor saddlemaker, he earned his tuition to the university by writing essays for his less assiduous fellow students and by winning at billiards (i.e., pool sharking). He took a graduate degree in physics, with a dissertation in kinetics, and began a long, exhausting and undistinguished career as a *privat docent* (tutor), teaching anything from anthropology to the sciences. At fifty-seven he suddenly burst upon the world with the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and over the next ten years he wrote the various critiques and other studies that were to lay the foundations of rigorous philosophy for the next two centuries.

Short (five feet), frail, and amazingly punctilious (housewives of Königsberg were reported to set their clocks by the regularity of his daily walk), Kant led a life almost solely of the mind. Still, he was in reliable contact with the currents of his day, reacting to both public and intellectual events. Indeed, it was the arrival of Rousseau's *Émile* that occasioned the only known, avoidable lapse in his schedule; he was so startled by the brilliance of Rousseau's arguments that he lost track of his time and resolved to respond to the Genevan. He did so by developing a moral theory that made a categorical imperative for individuals what Rousseau saw as the General Will of a society.

"Perpetual Peace"

Kant's "Perpetual Peace," a mature work, written in 1795 after he had established his system of philosophy, predicts the ever-widening pacification of a Liberal pacific union. It also explains that pacification, and at the same time suggests why Liberal states would not, regretfully, be pacific in their relations with non-Liberal states. Kant argues that perpetual peace will be guaranteed by the widening acceptance of three "definitive articles" of peace. When all nations have accepted the definitive articles in a metaphorical "treaty" of perpetual peace he asks them to sign, perpetual peace will have been established.

The importance of Immanuel Kant as an theorist of international ethics has been well appreciated.² Moreover, the ultimate aim of Kant's theory is to estab-

² A partial list of significant studies on Kant's international theory includes: A. C. Armstrong, "Kant's Philosophy of Peace and War," *Journal of Philosophy* 28 (1931), pp. 97–204; Karl Friedrich, *Inevitable Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948); Gallie, *Phi-*

lish the grounds on which a "moral politician"—"someone who conceives of the principles of political expediency in such a way that they [sic] can co-exist with morality"—can adopt a strategy of peace as a practical duty. To show that the duty is practical, Kant wants to demonstrate that it is not impossible. He does this by showing that it can be imagined to follow logically from human beings' pursuing their rational self-interest in the circumstances of the world as we know it.³

Kant's analytic theory of international politics is thus crucial to his project of eventual universal peace. "Perpetual Peace" helps us understand the interactive nature of international relations. Methodologically he tries to teach us that we cannot study either the systemic relations of states or the varieties of state behavior in isolation from one another. Like George and Martha in Edward Albee's *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?*, the behavior of state A and state B cannot be understood in isolation from its pair.⁴ Kant's states continue to live in international anarchy—in the sense that there is no world government—but this anarchy is tamed and made subject to law rather than to fear and threat of war. Kant's theory is, moreover, a theory of state interest and of what does and what does not constitute a threat. Just as the superior capability of another state would be inherently threatening in Hobbes's Structural Realists, so autocratic regimes would be assumed to be inherently threatening to Kantians. Rather than an alternative to rational national interest theory, Kant offers a specifica-

tion of what does (and should) constitute the public interest that a Liberal state should (and usually does) rationally pursue.

Kant, like Hobbes, begins with the state of nature, which is a state of war. "States," he bluntly says, "like lawless savages, exist in a condition devoid of right . . . this condition is one of war. . . ."⁵ International law constitutes no guarantee of justice in these circumstances. States therefore have the right to make war in this condition when they are injured (and legal proceedings do not provide satisfaction). But they also may make war (1) when they "believe" they are injured (and legal proceedings fail to satisfy the grievance) or (2) when the state experiences a "threat" as another state makes preparations for war or (3) when another state achieves an alarming increase in power.⁶ From this last consideration follows the right to maintain a balance of power.

The rights of peace include neutrality, rights to guarantees, and defensive alliances. During war all means of conflict (*jus in bello*) are allowed except those that render one's own citizens "unfit to be citizens" of a possible eventual peace based on international law. Thus spies, assassins, poisoners, sharpshooters, propaganda: All are banned. So too are war aims (*jus ad bellum*) that involve punishment, permanent conquest, subjugation, or extermination. Just wars are defensive in nature. Conquest for the sake of reforming an unjust enemy states is permitted, forcing them "to accept a new constitution of a nature that is unlikely to encourage their warlike inclination."⁷ But no peace should constitute a violation of the fundamental rights of the citizens of a conquered state.⁸

The state of war requires decisions on the basis of right, but it does not allow for security or welfare. The will to subjugate is always present, and the production of armaments for defense ("which often makes peace more oppressive and destructive of internal welfare than war itself") can never be relaxed. Only a true "state of international right" can establish peace. The "European balance of power" is nothing more than an illusion, like Swift's famous house constructed in such perfect harmony (balance) that as soon as a sparrow landed on it, it collapsed. Peace has to be founded on a different basis.⁹ Thus, for example, the United States and the USSR were peaceful in their Cold War relations, experiencing very few direct casualties. And Venezuela and Argentina have never fought a war against each other, nor have Iceland and Indonesia. But nuclear deterrence goes a long way to account for the "peace" of the first, and distance and lack of capacity a long way to account for the second and third.

³On the Disagreement between Morals and Politics in Relation to Perpetual Peace," in "Perpetual Peace," p. 118. I will cite Kant's works from Immanuel Kant, *Kant's Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). I cite "Perpetual Peace" (1795) as PP; "The Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" (1784) as UH; "The Contest of Faculties" (1798) as CF; "The Metaphysics of Morals" (1797) as MM.

⁴This was the minimum condition argued by Kenneth Waltz to be essential to a systemic, structural model of world politics. The analogy to Albee's play is Waltz's as well; see *Theory of International Politics*, where Waltz's quotes, "That which is George or Martha, individually, does not explain what is compounded between them, nor how" (p. 75).

⁵Kant, MM, para. 54, p. 165.

⁶Ibid., para. 56, p. 167.

⁷Ibid., para. 60, p. 170.

⁸Ibid., para. 57, pp. 168–69.

⁹That is, it has to be constructed by changes in domestic structures and international relations among states.

None of these sets of relations escaped from the state of war. The Kantian peace, on the other hand, is a state of peace, experienced while relations are close and interdependent and irrespective of arms levels or technologies

Preliminary Articles. Kant begins with a set of six preliminary articles designed to build confidence among states still in the state of war.¹⁰

1. No peace treaty will be considered valid if it harbors a secret intent to resume war at some more favorable opportunity. True peace agreements should be distinguished from truces if states are going to learn to trust each other.

2. No independent state should be subject to conquest, purchase, or inheritance. This provision is designed to establish the norm of "territorial integrity."

3. Standing armies will be gradually abolished.

4. No national debt will be incurred with the purpose of enhancing international power. This provision is designed to limit the incentives to engage in war by requiring that wars be fought from current revenues.

5. No state will forcibly interfere in the constitution or government of another. Supplementing the second provision, this guarantees "political independence"—the second of the two principles underlying modern sovereign equality.

6. No state will commit war crimes—use poisoners, assassins, promote subversion—because these are acts that destroy the mutual confidence a future peace will require.

Together these principles are designed to build the mutual confidence and respect that establishing a true peace will require. Well-intentioned, "enlightened despots" (Kant praises his own Frederick the Great) should seek to further these principles, and they sometimes have.¹¹ But these principles alone are not likely to be effective in the state of war, when confusion and powerful incentives for aggression are prevalent. What is needed, Kant argues, is an institutionalization—a constitutionalization—of peace. The continuing dangers of the state of war make it "necessary to establish a federation of peoples [to] protect one another against external aggression . . . [going beyond an] alliance which can be terminated at any time, so that it has to be renewed periodically."¹²

¹⁰ Kant, PP, pp. 93–97.

¹¹ Kant remarks on Frederick, *ibid.*, p. 102. This point was drawn to my attention by Dr. Dominique Leydet.

¹² Kant, MM, para. 54, p. 165. In 1792 Madison came to the same insight Kant developed. Madison criticized "Jean-Jacques Rousseau's" plan for collective security. Actually, as noted in chapter 4, this was the Abbé de St.-Pierre's plan, which Rousseau had presented and dissected. Madison wrote: "Instead of beginning with an external application, and even precluding internal remedies, he [Rousseau/St.-Pierre] ought to have commenced with, and chiefly relied on, the latter prescription. . . . As the first step towards a cure, the government itself must be regenerated. Its will must be made subordinate to, or rather the same with, the will of the community." Quoted in Marvin Meyers, ed., *The Mind of the Founder* (Hanover: University Press of England, 1981), p. 192, and drawn to my attention by Stanley Kober.

The Definitive Articles. The first definitive article requires that the civil constitution of the state be republican. By "republican" Kant means a political society that has, from a formal-legal point of view, solved the problem of combining moral autonomy, individualism, and social order. A private property and market-oriented economy partially addresses that dilemma in the private sphere. The public, or political, sphere is more troubling. Kant's answer is a republic that preserves juridical freedom—the legal equality of citizens as subjects—on the basis of a representative government with a separation of powers. Juridical freedom is preserved because the morally autonomous individual is by means of representation a self-legislator, making laws that apply equally to all citizens including himself. Tyranny is avoided because the individual is subject to laws he does not also administer.¹³

Liberal republics will progressively establish peace among themselves by means of the pacific federation, or union (*foedus pacificum*), described in Kant's second definitive article. The pacific union will establish peace within a federation of free states and securely maintain the rights of each state. The world will not have achieved the "perpetual peace" that provides the ultimate guarantor of republican freedom until "a late stage and after many unsuccessful attempts."¹⁴ Then, right conceptions of the appropriate constitution and great and sad experience will have taught all the nations the lessons of peace. Not until then will individuals enjoy perfect republican rights or the full guarantee of a global and just peace. In the meantime, the "pacific federation" of Liberal republics—"an enduring and gradually expanding federation likely to prevent war"—brings within it more and more republics (despite republican collapses, backsliding, and disastrous wars), creating an expanding separate peace.¹⁵ And Kant emphasizes: "It can be shown that this idea of federalism, extending gradually to encompass all states and thus leading to perpetual peace, is practicable and has objective reality. For if by good fortune one powerful and enlightened nation can form a republic (which is by nature inclined to seek peace), this will provide a focal point for federal association among other states. These will join up with the first one, thus securing the freedom of each state in accordance with the idea of international right, and the whole will gradually spread further and further by a series of alliances of this kind."¹⁶

¹³ Kant, PP, pp. 99–102; and see Riley, chap. 5.

¹⁴ Kant, UH, p. 47.

¹⁵ Kant, PP, p. 105. Some have suggested, following the UH, that peace will be achieved only when all states have become republican. I think Kant meant that the peace would be established among Liberal regimes and would expand by ordinary political and legal means as new Liberal regimes appeared. By a process of gradual extension the peace would become global and then perpetual; the occasion for wars with non-Liberals would disappear as non-Liberal regimes disappeared. This interpretation suggests that "peace comes piece (peace) by piece (peace)" and that the UH should be read in light of the later and more complete "Perpetual Peace."

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

The pacific union is neither a single peace treaty ending one war nor a world state or state of nations. Kant finds the first insufficient. The second and third are impossible or potentially tyrannical. National sovereignty precludes reliable subservience to a state of nations; a world state destroys the civic freedom on which the development of human capacities rests.¹⁷ Although Kant obliquely refers to various classical interstate confederations and modern diplomatic congresses, he develops no systematic organizational embodiment of this treaty, presumably because he does not find institutionalization necessary.¹⁸ He appears to have in mind a mutual nonaggression pact, perhaps a collective security agreement, and the cosmopolitan law set forth in the third definitive article.¹⁹

The third definitive article establishes a cosmopolitan law to operate in conjunction with the pacific union. The cosmopolitan law "shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality." In this Kant calls for the recognition of the "right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else's territory." This "does not extend beyond those conditions which make it possible for them to attempt to enter into relations [commerce] with the native inhabitants."²⁰ Hospitality does not require extending to foreigners either the right to citizenship or the right to settlement, unless the foreign visitors would perish if they were expelled. Foreign conquest and plunder also find no justification under this right. Hospitality does appear to include the right of access and the obligation of maintaining the opportunity for citizens to exchange goods and ideas, without imposing the obligation to trade (a voluntary act in all cases under Liberal constitutions). Liberal republican states, Kant suggests, would establish a peace among themselves while remaining in a state of war with nonrepublics.

LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM

The historical record of Liberal international relations seems to support Kant's speculations. Liberal principles and institutions seem to have had three striking effects on the foreign affairs of Liberal states. They have created incentives for

¹⁷Kant, UH, p. 50.

¹⁸See Schwarz (1962), p. 77, and Riley (1983), chap. 5.

¹⁹Kant's *foedus pacificum* is thus neither a *pactum pacis* (a single peace treaty) nor a *civitas gentium* (a world state). He appears to have anticipated something like a less formally institutionalized League of Nations or United Nations. One could argue that these two institutions in practice worked for Liberal states and only for Liberal states. But no specifically Liberal "pacific union" was institutionalized. Instead Liberal states have behaved for the past 200 years as if such a Kantian pacific union and Treaty of Perpetual Peace had been signed.

²⁰Kant, PP, p. 106.

a separate peace among Liberal states, for aggression against non-Liberals, and for complaisance in vital matters of security and economic cooperation.

The first of the effects of Liberalism on the foreign relations of Liberal states is the establishment of a peace among them.²¹ During the nineteenth century the United States and Great Britain engaged in nearly continual strife, including one war, the War of 1812. But after the Reform Act of 1832 defined actual representation as the formal source of the sovereignty of the British Parliament, Britain and the United States negotiated their disputes despite, for example, British grievances against the North's blockade of the South, with which Britain had close economic ties. Despite severe Anglo-French colonial rivalry, Liberal France and Liberal Britain formed an entente against illiberal Germany before World War I. And in 1914–1915 Italy, the Liberal member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria, chose not to fulfill its treaty obligations under the alliance to support its allies. Instead it joined in an alliance with Britain and France that had the result of preventing it from having to fight other Liberal states, and it then declared war on Germany and Austria. And despite generations of Anglo-American tension and Britain's wartime restrictions on American trade with Germany, the United States leaned toward Britain and France from 1914 to 1917, before entering the war on their side.

Nowhere was this special peace among Liberal states more clearly proclaimed than in President Woodrow Wilson's War Message of April 2, 1917: "Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed people of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles."²² Even in the quiet recesses of secret diplomacy, Liberalism has shaped the discourse of statesmen at crucial times of national emergency. In October 1938, as fears of war rose in Europe, President Roosevelt sent a special message to Britain. He asked the special envoy, Colonel Arthur Murray, in Murray's words, "to convey . . . to the Prime Minister . . . an assurance—in the

²¹Clarence Streit, *Union Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Leading Democracies* (New York: Harper's, 1938), pp. 88, 90–92, seems to have been the first to point out (in contemporary foreign relations) the empirical tendency of democracies to maintain peace among themselves, and he made this the foundation of his proposal for a (non-Kantian) federal union of the fifteen leading democracies of the 1930s. D. V. Babst, "A Force for Peace," *Industrial Research* (April 1972), pp. 55–58, performed a quantitative study of this phenomenon of "democratic peace." And R. J. Rummel did a similar study of "libertarianism" (in the sense of *laissez-faire*), focusing on the postwar period in "Libertarianism and International Violence." I use Liberal in a wider (Kantian) sense in my discussion of this issue in "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Part I (1983). In that essay I survey the period from 1790 to the present and find no war among Liberal states. Recent work on the thesis of democratic peace is covered later in the chapter.

²²Woodrow Wilson, *The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, ed. Albert Shaw (New York: Review of Reviews, 1924), p. 378.

event of hostilities and the United States being neutral—of his [Roosevelt's] desire to help in every way in his power. . . . He [Roosevelt] said he wished the Prime Minister to feel he had, in so far as he, the President, was able to achieve it, 'the industrial resources of the American nation behind him in the event of war with the dictatorships.'"²³

Beginning in the eighteenth century and slowly growing since then, a zone of peace, which Kant called the pacific federation or pacific union, began to be established among Liberal societies. (More than sixty Liberal states currently make up the union. Most are in Europe and North America, but they can be found on every continent.)

Of course the outbreak of war in any given year between any two given states is a low-probability event. But the occurrence of a war between any two adjacent states, considered over a long time, would be more probable. The near absence of war between Liberal states, whether adjacent or not, for almost two hundred years thus may have significance. More significant perhaps is that when states are forced to decide on which side of an impending world war they will fight, Liberal states all wind up on the same side, despite the complexity of the paths that take them there. And we should recall that medieval and early modern Europe were the warring cockpits of states, wherein France and Britain and the Low Countries engaged in nearly constant strife. Then in the late eighteenth century there began to emerge Liberal regimes. At first hesitant and confused, and later clear and confident as Liberal regimes gained deeper domestic foundations and longer international experience, a pacific union of these Liberal states became established. These characteristics do not prove that the peace among Liberals is statistically significant or that Liberalism is the peace's sole valid explanation.²⁴ But they do suggest that we consider the possi-

²³ From Barbara Farnham, *Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political Decision-Making* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming 1996). One can presume that Roosevelt's motivation, as in most political events, was complex. He did not categorically support every foreign policy of a democracy (nor should he have). He, for example, questioned the legitimacy of the British Empire. America had failed to support the democracies financially in the 1920s. Roosevelt was concerned as well to avoid a Nazi conquest of Europe and the threat a united Nazi Europe would pose to the United States. "On the Atlantic," the president also said, "our first line is the continued independent existence of a very large group of nations." (From a January 1939 briefing to the Senate Military Affairs Committee, quoted in John MacVicar Haight, *American Aid to France, 1938-1940* [New York: Atheneum, 1979], p. 98.) But Roosevelt's aim was not to establish a balance of power in Europe between Nazi Germany and democratic Britain and France but to defeat the Nazi forces altogether. See also Haight, pp. 30-31.

²⁴ Babst (1972) did make a preliminary test of the significance of the distribution of alliance partners in World War I. He found that the possibility that the actual distribution of alliance partners could have occurred by chance was less than 1 percent (p. 56). But this assumes that there was an equal possibility that any two nations could have gone to war with each other, and this is a strong assumption. Rummel (1983) has a further discussion of significance as it applies to his libertarian thesis.

TABLE 8.1

The Liberal Community
(By date "Liberal")¹

Period		Total Number
18th century	Swiss Cantons ² French Republic 1790-1795 United States, ² 1776-	3
1800-1850	Swiss Confederations, United States France, 1830-1849 Belgium, 1830- Great Britain, 1832- Netherlands, 1848- Piedmont, 1848- Denmark, 1849-	8
1850-1900	Switzerland, United States, Belgium, Great Britain, Netherlands Piedmont, -1861, Italy 1861- Denmark, -1866 Sweden, 1864- Greece, 1864- Canada, 1867- ³ France, 1871- Argentina, 1880- Chile, 1891-	13
1900-1945	Switzerland, United States, Great Britain, Sweden, Canada Greece, -1911, 1928-1936 Italy, -1922 Belgium, -1940; Netherlands, -1940; Argentina, -1943 France, -1940 Chile, -1924, 1932 Australia, 1901	29

TABLE 8.1 (continued)

Period	Total Number
Norway, 1905–1940	
New Zealand, 1907–	
Colombia, 1910–1949	
Denmark, 1914–1940	
Poland, 1917–1935	
Latvia, 1922–1934	
Germany, 1918–1932	
Austria, 1918–1934	
Estonia, 1919–1934	
Finland, 1919–	
Uruguay, 1919–	
Costa Rica, 1919–	
Czechoslovakia 1920–1939	
Ireland, 1920–	
Mexico, 1928–	
Lebanon, 1944–	
1945 ⁴	68
Switzerland, the United States,	
Great Britain, Sweden	
Canada, Australia, New Zealand,	
Finland, Ireland, Mexico	
Uruguay, –1973; 1985–	
Chile, –1973; 1990–	
Lebanon, –1975	
Costa Rica, –1948, 1953–	
Iceland, 1944–	
France, 1945–	
Denmark, 1945–	
Norway, 1945–	
Austria, 1945–	
Brazil, 1945–1954, 1955–1964;	
1985–	
Belgium, 1946–	
Netherlands, 1946–	
Italy, 1946–	
Philippines, 1946–1972; 1987–	
India, 1947–1975, 1977–	
Sri Lanka, 1948–1961, 1963–	
1971, 1978–1983, 1988–	
Ecuador, 1948–1963, 1979–	

Period	Total Number
Israel, 1949–	
West Germany, 1949–	
Greece, 1950–1967, 1975–	
Peru 1950–1962, 1963–1968,	
1980–	
Turkey, 1950–1960, 1966–1971;	
1984–	
Japan, 1951–	
Bolivia, 1956–1969, 1982–	
Colombia, 1958–	
Venezuela, 1959–	
Nigeria, 1961–1964, 1979–1984	
Jamaica, 1962–	
Trinidad and Tobago, 1962–	
Senegal, 1963–	
Malaysia, 1963–	
Botswana, 1966–	
Singapore, 1965–	
Portugal, 1976–	
Spain, 1978–	
Dominican Republic, 1978–	
Ecuador, 1978–	
Peru, 1980–1990	
Honduras, 1981–	
Papua New Guinea, 1982–	
El Salvador, 1984–	
Argentina, 1983–	
Uruguay, 1985–	
Mauritius, 1987–	
South Korea, 1988–	
Taiwan, 1988–	
Thailand, 1988–	
Pakistan, 1988–	
Panama, 1989–	
Paraguay, 1989–	
Madagascar, 1990–	
Mongolia, 1990–	
Namibia, 1990–	
Nepal, 1990–	

TABLE 8.1 (continued)

Period	Total Number
Nicaragua, 1990–	
Poland, 1990–	
Hungary, 1990–	
Czechoslovakia, 1990–	

¹I have drawn up this *approximate* list of Liberal regimes (including regimes that were Liberal democratic as of 1990) according to the four “Kantian” institutions described as essential: market and private property economies; politics that are externally sovereign; citizens who possess juridical rights; and “republican” (whether republican or parliamentary monarchy), representative government. This last includes the requirement that the legislative branch have an effective role in public policy and be formally and competitively (either inter- or intraparty) elected. Furthermore, I have taken into account whether male suffrage is wide (that is, 30 percent) or, as Kant would have had it (MM, p. 139), open to “achievement” by inhabitants (for example, to poll tax payers or householders) of the national or metropolitan territory. (This list of Liberal regimes is thus more inclusive than a list of democratic regimes, or polyarchies [G. Bingham Powell, *Contemporary Democracies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 5].) Female suffrage is granted within a generation of its being demanded by an extensive female suffrage movement, and representative government is internally sovereign (for example, including and especially over military and foreign affairs) as well as stable (in existence for at least three years). Arthur Banks and William Overstreet, eds., *A Political Handbook of the World, 1982–83* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983); United Kingdom, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *A Yearbook of the Commonwealth 1980* (London: HMSO, 1980), *The Europa Yearbook for 1985* (London: Europa Publications, 1985), 2 vols.; William Langer, ed., *The Encyclopedia of World History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968); U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981); Raymond Gastil, *Freedom in the World 1985* (New York: Freedom House, 1985); R. Bruce McCollm and Freedom House Survey Team, eds., *Freedom in the World 1990–1991* (New York: Freedom House, 1991); and James Finn et al., *Freedom in the World 1994–1995* (New York: Freedom House, 1995).

²There are domestic variations within these Liberal regimes. For example, Switzerland was Liberal only in certain cantons; the United States was Liberal only north of the Mason-Dixon line until 1865, when it became Liberal throughout. These lists also exclude ancient “republics,” since none appears to fit Kant’s criteria (Stephen Holmes, “Aristippus in and out of Athens,” *American Political Science Review* 73, 1 [1979], pp. 113–28).

³Canada, as a commonwealth within the British Empire, did not have formal control of its foreign policy during this period.

⁴Selected list, excludes Liberal regimes with populations less than one million. These include all states categorized as “Free” by Freedom House and those “Partly Free” (at least 4 on the political scale and 5 on the civil liberties scale).

bility that Liberals have indeed established a separate peace—but only among themselves.

This is a feature, moreover, that appears to be special to Liberal societies. Neither specific regional attributes nor historic alliances or friendships account for the wide reach of the Liberal peace. The peace extends as far as, and no farther than, the relations among Liberal states, not including non-Liberal

states in an otherwise Liberal region (such as the North Atlantic during the 1930s) or excluding Liberal states in a less Liberal region (such as Central America or Africa).

Relations among any group of states with similar social structures or with compatible values or pluralistic social structures are not similarly peaceful.²⁵ Feudal warfare was frequent and very much a sport of the monarchs and nobility. There have not been enough truly totalitarian, fascist powers (nor have they lasted long enough) to test fairly their pacific compatibility, but fascist powers in the wider sense of nationalist, military dictatorships fought one another in the 1930s in Eastern Europe. Communist powers have engaged in wars more recently in East Asia when China invaded Vietnam and Vietnam invaded Cambodia. We have not had enough democratic Socialist societies to consider the relevance of Socialist pacification. The more abstract category of pluralism does not suffice. Certainly Germany was pluralist when it engaged in war with Liberal states in 1914; Japan as well in 1941. But they were not Liberal. Peace among Liberals thus appears to be a special characteristic.

Here the predictions of Liberal pacifists are borne out: Liberal states do exercise peaceful restraint, and a separate peace exists among them. This separate peace provides a solid foundation for the United States’ crucial alliances with the Liberal powers (NATO, the Japanese alliance, ANZUS). This foundation appears to be impervious to the quarrels with allies that have bedeviled many U.S. administrations. It also offers the promise of a continuing peace among Liberal states. And as the number of Liberal states increases, it announces the possibility of global peace this side of the grave or world conquest.

Liberalism also carries with it a second effect—what Hume called “imprudent vehemence,” or aggression against non-Liberals.²⁶ Peaceful restraint seems

²⁵There is a rich contemporary literature devoted to explaining international cooperation and integration. Karl Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957) develops the idea of a “pluralistic security community” that bears a resemblance to the pacific union, but Deutsch limits it geographically and finds compatibility of values, mutual responsiveness, and predictability of behavior among decision makers as its essential foundations. These are important, but their particular content, Liberalism, appears to be more telling. All three traits characterized the eighteenth-century state of war and balance of power. Joseph Nye in *Peace in Parts* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971) steps away from the geographic limits Deutsch sets and focuses on levels of development; but his analysis is directed toward explaining integration—a more intensive form of cooperation than the pacific union.

²⁶Hume, “Of the Balance of Power,” *Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary*, pp. 346–47. With “imprudent vehemence,” Hume refers to the reluctance to negotiate an early peace with France and the total scale of the effort devoted to persecuting that war, which together were responsible for over half the length of the fighting and an enormous war debt. Hume of course is not describing fully Liberal republics as defined here, but the characteristics he describes do seem to reflect some of the Liberal republican features of the British eighteenth-century constitution (the influence of both popular opinion and a representative [even if severely limited] legislature). He contrasts these effects with the “prudent politics” that should govern the balance of power and with the special but different failings characteristic

TABLE 8.2

International Wars Listed Chronologically*

British-Maharattan (1817–1818)	Franco-Mexican (1862–1867)
Greek (1821–1828)	Ecuadorian-Colombian (1863)
Franco-Spanish (1823)	Second Polish (1863–1864)
First Anglo-Burmese (1823–1826)	Spanish-Santo Dominican (1863–1865)
Javanese (1825–1830)	Second Schleswig-Holstein (1864)
Russo-Persian (1826–1828)	Lopez (1864–1870)
Russo-Turkish (1828–1829)	Spanish-Chilean (1865–1866)
First Polish (1831)	Seven Weeks (1866)
First Syrian (1831–1832)	Ten Years (1868–1878)
Texan (1835–1836)	Franco-Prussian (1870–1871)
First British-Afghan (1838–1842)	Dutch-Achinese (1873–1878)
Second Syrian (1839–1840)	Balkan (1875–1877)
Franco-Algerian (1839–1847)	Russo-Turkish (1877–1878)
Peruvian-Bolivian (1841)	Bosnian (1878)
First British-Sikh (1845–1846)	Second British-Afghan (1878–1880)
Mexican-American (1846–1848)	Pacific (1879–1880)
Austro-Sardinian (1848–1849)	British-Zulu (1879)
First Schleswig-Holstein (1848–1849)	Franco-Indochinese (1882–1884)
Hungarian (1848–1849)	Mahdist (1882–1885)
Second British-Sikh (1848–1849)	Sino-French (1884–1885)
Roman Republic (1849)	Central American (1885)
La Plata (1851–1852)	Serbo-Bulgarian (1885)
First Turco-Montenegrin (1852–1853)	Sino-Japanese (1894–1895)
Crimean (1853–1856)	Franco-Madagascan (1894–1895)
Anglo-Persian (1856–1857)	Cuban (1895–1898)
Sepoy (1857–1859)	Italo-Ethiopian (1895–1896)
Second Turco-Montenegrin (1858–1859)	First Philippine (1896–1898)
Italian Unification (1859)	Greco-Turkish (1897)
Spanish-Moroccan (1859–1860)	Spanish-American (1898)
Italo-Roman (1860)	Second Philippine (1899–1902)
Italo-Sicilian (1860–1861)	Boer (1899–1902)
	Boxer Rebellion (1900)

of "enormous monarchies." The monarchies are apparently worse; they risk total defeat and collapse because they are prone to strategic overextension, bureaucratic and ministerial decay in court intrigue and praetorian rebellion (pp. 347–48). In this connection one can compare the fates of Britain with its imprudence with Louis XIV's or Napoleon's France or, for that matter, Hitler's Germany or Mussolini's Italy or Brezhnev's Soviet Union. Overextension to the extent of destruction is clearly worse, from the strategic point of view, than a bit of imprudence.

Ilinden (1903)	First Kashmir (1947–1949)
Russo-Japanese (1904–1905)	Palestine (1948–1949)
Central American (1906)	Hyderabad (1948)
Central American (1907)	Korean (1950–1953)
Spanish-Moroccan (1909–1910)	Algerian (1954–1962)
Italo-Turkish (1911–1912)	Russo-Hungarian (1956)
First Balkan (1912–1913)	Sinai (1956)
Second Balkan (1913)	Tibetan (1956–1959)
World War I (1914–1918)	Sino-Indian (1962)
Russian Nationalities (1917–1921)	Vietnamese (1965–1975)
Russo-Polish (1919–1920)	Second Kashmir (1965)
Hungarian-Allies (1919)	Six-Day (1967)
Greco-Turkish (1919–1922)	Israeli-Egyptian (1969–1970)
Riffian (1921–1926)	Football (1969)
Druze (1925–1927)	Bangladesh (1971)
Sino-Soviet (1929)	Philippine-MNLF (1972–)
Manchurian (1931–1933)	Yom Kippur (1973)
Chaco (1932–1935)	Turco-Cypriot (1974)
Italo-Ethiopian (1935–1936)	Ethiopian-Eritrean (1974–)
Sino-Japanese (1937–1941)	Vietnamese-Cambodian (1975–)
Changkufeng (1938)	Timor (1975–)
Nomohan (1939)	Saharan (1975–)
World War II (1939–1945)	Ogaden (1976–)
Russo-Finnish (1939–1940)	Ugandan-Tanzanian (1978–1979)
Franco-Thai (1940–1941)	Sino-Vietnamese (1979)
Indonesian (1945–1946)	Russo-Afghan (1979–)
Indochinese (1945–1954)	Iran-Iraqi (1980–)
Madagascan (1947–1948)	

*The table is from Melvin Small and J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982), pp. 79–80. This is a partial list of international wars fought between 1816 and 1980. In Appendices A and B Small and Singer identify a total of 575 wars in this period, but approximately 159 of them appear to be largely domestic or civil wars.

This definition of war excludes covert interventions, a few of which have been directed by Liberal regimes against other Liberal regimes. One example is the United States' effort to destabilize the Chilean election and Allende's government. Nonetheless, it is significant that such interventions are not pursued publicly as acknowledged policy. The covert destabilization campaign against Chile is recounted by the U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Covert Action in Chile, 1963–73*, 94th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975).

The argument (and this list) also exclude civil wars. Civil wars differ from international wars not in the ferocity of combat but in the issues that engender them. Two nations that could abide each other as independent neighbors separated by a border might well be the fiercest of enemies if forced to live together in one state, jointly deciding how to raise and spend taxes, choose leaders, and legislate fundamental questions of value. Notwithstanding these differences, no civil wars that I recall upset the argument of Liberal pacification.

to work only in the Liberals' relations with other Liberals. Liberal states have fought numerous wars with non-Liberal states.

Many of these wars have been defensive and thus prudent by necessity. Liberal states have been attacked and threatened by non-Liberal states that do not exercise any special restraint in their dealings with Liberal states. Authoritarian rulers both stimulate and respond to an international political environment in which conflicts of prestige, interest, and pure fear of what other states might do all lead states toward war. War and conquest have thus characterized the careers of many authoritarian rulers and ruling parties, from Louis XIV and Napoleon to Mussolini's Fascists, Hitler's Nazis, and Stalin's Communists.

But imprudent aggression by the Liberal state has also characterized many of these wars. Both Liberal France and Britain fought expansionist colonial wars throughout the nineteenth century. The United States fought a similar war with Mexico in 1846–1848, waged a war of annihilation against the American Indians, and intervened militarily against sovereign states many times before and after World War II. Liberal states invade weak non-Liberal societies and display exceptional degrees of distrust in their dealings with powerful non-Liberal states.²⁷

Nonetheless, establishing the statistical significance of Hume's assertion appears remarkably difficult. The best statistical evidence indicates that "libertarian" or "democratic" states (slightly different measures) are not less war-prone than nonlibertarian or nondemocratic states. Indeed, in these measures they appear to be more war-prone.²⁸ War proneness is not, however, a measure of imprudent aggression since many wars are defensive. But that does not mean that we can simply blame warfare on the authoritarians or totalitarians, as many of our more enthusiastic politicians would have us do.²⁹ Liberal states ("liber-

²⁷ For a discussion of the historical effects of Liberalism on colonialism, the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, and post-World War Two interventions against non-Liberal regimes, see "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Part 2 (1983) and the sources cited there.

²⁸ See Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "The War-proneness of Democratic Regimes," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1 (December 1976), pp. 50–69; Steve Chan, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall. . . Are Freer Countries More Pacific?," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (December 1984), pp. 617–48; and Erich Weede, "Democracy and War Involvement," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (December 1984), pp. 649–64. These quantitative studies counter Rummel's (1983) view that libertarian states are less prone to violence than nonlibertarian states, which he based on a sample of 1976–1980 data not representative of the war year data of 1816–1980 of Chan or the 1960–1980 data of Weede.

²⁹ There are, however, serious studies that show that Marxist regimes have higher military spending per capita than non-Marxist regimes (James Payne, "Marxism and Militarism," *Polity* [1987]). But this should not be interpreted as a sign of the inherent aggressiveness of authoritarian or totalitarian governments or—with even greater enthusiasm—the inherent and global peacefulness of Liberal regimes. Marxist regimes, in particular, represent a minority in the current international system; they are strategically encircled, and because of their lack of domestic legitimacy, they might be said to "suffer" the twin burden of needing

tarian") acted as initiators in 24 out of the 56 interstate wars in which they participated between 1816 and 1980 while non-Liberals were on the initiating side in 91 out of 187 times.³⁰ Although non-Liberal states initiated a higher percentage of interstate wars, Liberal metropolises were the overwhelming participators in "extrasystemic wars," colonial wars, which we can assume to have been by and large initiated by the metropole (see below). Furthermore, the United States intervened in the Third World more than twice as often in the period 1946–1976 as the Soviet Union did in 1946–1979.³¹ Relatedly, the United States devoted one-quarter and the Soviet Union, one-tenth, of their respective defense budgets to forces designed for Third World interventions (where responding to perceived threats would presumably have a less than purely defensive character).³²

Although Liberal initiation of wars suggests some basis for Hume's assertion, it does not resolve the claim he made. Initiation or response may reflect either aggressive or defensive policy, in that an aggressive policy may provoke a rival to initiate a war and a defensive policy may require preemption. Hume appears to suggest that Liberal policy has a tendency to be unnecessarily aggressive. To assess his assertion, we need to take into account the specific circumstances—the threats with which the state is faced, its resources, and its goals—and doing this requires a historical understanding of time and place. If Liberals were always aggressive or always nonaggressive in relations with non-Liberals, we could reasonably argue that they are also unnecessarily aggressive, or were not. Thus we were able to support the existence of something special in Liberal foreign relations with other Liberals. But relations with non-Liberals appear more complicated. Unless we can normalize not just the number but the situations of Liberal relations with non-Liberals and non-Liberal relations with non-Liberals, the best we can do, if we can do that, is illustrate imprudent vehemence.

We should recall as well that authoritarian states also have a record of imprudent aggression. It was not semi-Liberal Britain that collapsed in 1815, but Napoleonic France. It was the Kaiser's Germany that dissolved in 1918, not republican France and Liberal Britain and democratic America. It was imperial

defenses against both external and internal enemies. Andreski, "On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships" moreover, argues that (purely) military dictatorships, because of their domestic fragility, have little incentive to engage in foreign military adventures.

³⁰ Chan (1984), p. 636.

³¹ Walter Clemens, "The Superpowers and the Third World," in Charles Kegley and Pat McGowan, *Foreign Policy: USA/USSR* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982), pp. 117–18.

³² Barry Posen and Stephen Van Evera, "Overarming and Underwhelming," *Foreign Policy* 40 (1980), pp. 99–118, and "Reagan Administration Defense Policy," in Kenneth Oye, Robert Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Eagle Defiant* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983), pp. 86–89.

Japan and Nazi Germany that disappeared in 1945, not the United States or the United Kingdom.³³ It is the contrast with ideal rational strategy and even more the comparison with Liberal accommodation with fellow Liberals that highlight the aggressive imprudence of Liberal relations with non-Liberals.

Most wars, moreover, seem to arise out of calculations and miscalculations of interest, misunderstandings, and mutual suspicions, such as those that characterized the origins of World War I. But we can find expressions of aggressive intent and apparently unnecessary vehemence by the Liberal state characterizing a large number of wars.³⁴

In relations with powerful non-Liberal states, Liberal states have missed opportunities to pursue the negotiation of arms reduction and arms control when it has been in the mutual strategic interest, and they have failed to construct wider schemes of accommodation that are needed to supplement arms control. Prior to the outbreak of World War I, this is the charge that Lord Sanderson leveled against Sir Eyre Crowe in Sanderson's response to Crowe's classic memorandum on the state of British relations with Germany.³⁵ Sanderson pointed out that Crowe interpreted German demands to participate in the settlement of international disputes and to have a "place in the sun" (colonies) of a size not too dissimilar to that enjoyed by the other great powers, as evidence of a fundamental aggressiveness driving toward world domination. Crowe may well have perceived an essential feature of Wilhelmine Germany, and Sanderson's attempt to place Germany in the context of other rising powers (bumptious but not aggressively pursuing world domination) may have been naive. But the interesting thing to note is less the conclusions reached than Crowe's chain of argument and evidence. He rejects continued accommodation (appeasement) with Germany not because he shows that Germany is more bumptious than France and not because he shows that Germany has greater potential as a world hegemon than the United States, which he does not even consider in this connection. Instead he is (legitimately) perplexed by the real uncertainty of German foreign policy and by its "erratic, domineering, and often frankly aggressive spirit," which accords with the well-known personal characteristics of "the present Ruler of Germany."

³³ See David Lake, "Powerful Pacifists," *American Political Science Review* 86, 1 (1992), pp. 24–37. This does not necessarily mean that the non-Liberals are strategically inferior or less capable of mobilizing the resources needed to win. Non-Liberal Russia bore the burden of both those sets of victories. The Liberal advantage in World Wars I and II was in not fighting each other, but in being resistant to defection to the non-Liberal camp.

³⁴ The following paragraphs build on arguments I present in "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Part 2.

³⁵ Memoranda by Mr. Eyre Crowe, January 1, 1907, and by Lord Sanderson, February 25, 1907, in G. P. Gooch et al., eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914* (London: HMSO, 1928), vol. 3, pp. 397–431.

Similar evidence of deeply held suspicion appears to characterize U.S. diplomacy toward the Soviet Union. In a fascinating memorandum to President Wilson written in 1919, Herbert Hoover (then one of Wilson's advisers) recommended that the president speak out against the danger of "world domination" that the "Bolsheviki"—a "tyranny that is the negation of democracy"—posed to free peoples. Rejecting military intervention as excessively costly and likely to "make us a party in reestablishing the reactionary classes in their economic domination over the lower classes," he proposed a "relief program" designed to undercut some of the popular appeal the Bolsheviks were garnering both in the Soviet Union and abroad. Although acknowledging that the evidence was not yet clear, he concluded: "If the militant features of Bolshevism were drawn in colors with their true parallel with Prussianism as an attempt at world domination that we do not stand for, it would check the fears that today haunt all men's minds." (The actual U.S. intervention in the Soviet Union was limited to supporting anti-Bolshevik Czechoslovak soldiers in Siberia and to protecting military supplies in Murmansk from German seizure.)³⁶

In the postwar period, and particularly following the outbreak of the Korean War, U.S. diplomacy equated the "International Communist Movement" (all Communist states and parties) with "Communist imperialism" and with a domestic tyranny in the USSR that required a Cold War contest and international subversion as means of legitimizing its own police state. U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles most clearly expressed this conviction, together with his own commitment to a strategy of "liberation," when he declared: "[W]e shall never have a secure peace or a happy world so long as Soviet communism dominates one third of all the peoples that there are, and is in the process of trying at least to extend its rule to many others."³⁷

Opportunities for splitting the Communist bloc along cleavages of strategic national interest were delayed. Burdened with the war in Vietnam, the United States took ten years to appreciate and exploit the strategic opportunity of the Sino-Soviet split. Even the signal strategic, "offensive" success of the early Cold War, the defection of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc, did not receive the wholehearted welcome that a strategic assessment of its importance would have

³⁶ Herbert Hoover to President Wilson March 29, 1919, excerpted in Thomas Paterson, ed., *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1978), vol. 2, p. 95.

³⁷ U.S. Senate, *Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Nomination of John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State Designate, 15 January 1953*, 83d Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 5–6. John L. Gaddis has noted logistical differences between laissez-faire and social welfare Liberals in policy toward the Soviet Union. In U.S. policy, until the advent of the Reagan administration, the fiscal conservatism of Republicans led them to favor a narrow strategy; the fiscal liberality of Democrats led to a broader strategy. See *Strategies of Containment*.

warranted.³⁸ Both relationships, with Yugoslavia and China, became subject to alternating, largely ideologically derived moods: Visions of exception (they were "less ruthless," more organic to the indigenous, traditional culture) sparred with bouts of liberal soul-searching ("we cannot associate ourselves with a totalitarian state").

Imprudent vehemence is also associated with Liberal foreign policy toward weak non-Liberal states; no greater spirit of accommodation or tolerance informs Liberal policy toward the many weak non-Liberal states in the Third World. This problem affects both conservative Liberals and welfare Liberals, but the two can be distinguished by differing styles of interventions.³⁹

Protecting "native rights" from "native" oppressors, and protecting universal rights of property and settlement from local transgressions, introduced especially Liberal motives for imperial aggression. Ending the slave trade destabilized nineteenth-century West African oligarchies, yet encouraging "legitimate trade" required protecting the property of European merchants; declaring the illegitimacy of "suttee" or of domestic slavery also attacked local cultural traditions that had sustained the stability of indigenous political authority. Europeans settling in sparsely populated areas destroyed the livelihood of tribes that relied on hunting. The tribes defensively retaliated in force; the settlers called for imperial protection.⁴⁰ The protection of cosmopolitan Liberal rights thus bred a demand for imperial rule that violated the liberty of Native Americans, Africans, and Asians. In practice, once the exigencies of ruling an empire came

³⁸Thirty-three divisions of armed soldiers, the withdrawal of the Soviet bloc from the Mediterranean, political disarray in the Communist movement: These advantages called out for a quick and friendly response. An effective U.S. ambassador in place to present Tito's position to Washington, the public character of the expulsion from the Cominform (June 1948), and a presidential administration in the full flush of creative statesmanship (and an electoral victory) also contributed to Truman's decision to rescue Yugoslavia from the Soviet embargo by providing trade and loans (1949). Nonetheless (according to Yugoslav sources), this crisis was also judged to be an appropriate moment to put pressure on Yugoslavia to resolve the questions of Trieste and Carinthia, to cut its support for the guerrillas in Greece, and to repay prewar (prerevolutionary) debts compensating the property owners of nationalized land and mines. Nor did Yugoslavia's strategic significance exempt it from inclusion among the countries condemned as "Captive Nations" (1959) or secure most-favored-nation trade status in the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. Ideological anticommunism and the porousness of the American political system to lobbies combined (according to George Kennan, ambassador to Yugoslavia at that time) to add these inconvenient burdens to a crucial strategic relationship. (John C. Campbell, *Tito's Separate Road* [New York: Council on Foreign Relations/Harper and Row, 1967], pp. 18–27; Suctozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, in Vladimir Dedijer, *The Battle Stalin Lost* [New York: Viking, 1970], p. 268; George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1950–1963* [Boston: Little, Brown, 1972], chap. 12).

³⁹See Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973) for an interesting analysis of the impact of Liberal ideology on American foreign aid policy, esp. chap. 3 and pp. 313–23.

⁴⁰Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Vintage, 1945), vol. I, p. 351. Tocqueville describes how European settlement destroys the game; the absence of game

into play, Liberal imperialism resulted in the oppression of "native" Liberals seeking self-determination in order to maintain imperial security, to avoid local chaos and international interference by another imperial power attempting to take advantage of local disaffection.

Thus nineteenth-century Liberals, such as British Prime Minister William Gladstone, pondered whether Egypt's protonationalist Arabi rebellion (1881–1882) was truly Liberal nationalist (they discovered it was not) before intervening to protect strategic lifelines to India, commerce, and investment.⁴¹ These dilemmas of Liberal imperialism are also reflected in U.S. imperialism in the Caribbean, where, for example, following the Spanish-American War of 1898, Article III of the Platt Amendment gave the United States the "right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty. . . ."⁴²

The record of Liberalism in the non-Liberal world is not solely a catalog of oppression and imprudence. The North American West and the settlement colonies—Australia and New Zealand—represent a successful transplant of Liberal institutions, albeit in a temperate, underpopulated, and then depopulated environment and at the cost of Native American and Aboriginal rights. Similarly, the twentieth-century expansion of Liberalism into less powerful non-Liberal areas has also had some striking successes. The forcible liberalization of Germany and Japan following World War II and the long covert financing of Liberal parties in Italy are the more significant instances of successful transplant. Covert financing of Liberalism in Chile and occasional diplomatic

reduces the Indians to starvation. Both then exercise their rights to self-defense. But the colonists are able to call in the power of the imperial government. Palmerston once declared that he would never employ force to promote purely private interests—whether commercial or settlement. He also declared that he would faithfully protect the lives and liberty of English subjects. In circumstances such as those Tocqueville described, Palmerston's distinctions were irrelevant. See Kenneth Bourne, *Palmerston: The Early Years* (New York: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 624–26. Other colonial settlements and their dependence on imperial expansion are examined in Ronald Robinson, "Non-European Foundations of Imperialism," in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe, eds., *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism* (London: Longmans, 1972).

⁴¹Gladstone had proclaimed his support for the equal rights of all nations in his Midlothian Speeches. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt served as a secret agent in Egypt keeping Gladstone informed of the political character of Arabi's movement. The Liberal dilemma in 1882—were they intervening against genuine nationalism or a military adventurer (Arabi)?—was best expressed in Joseph Chamberlain's memorandum to the cabinet, June 21, 1882, excerpted in J. L. Garvin and J. Amery, *Life of Joseph Chamberlain* (London: Macmillan, 1935), vol. 1, p. 448. And see Peter Mansfield, *The British in Egypt* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), chaps. 2 and 3; Ronald Hyam, *Britain's Imperial Century: 1815–1914* (London: Batsford, 1976), chap. 8; and Robert Tignor, *Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

⁴²The Platt Amendment is excerpted in Paterson, p. 328.

démarches to nudge aside military threats to non-Communist democratic parties (as in Peru in 1962, South Korea in 1963, and the Dominican Republic in 1962⁴³ and again in 1978) illustrate policies that, though less successful, were directed toward Liberal goals. These particular postwar Liberal successes also are the product of special circumstances: the existence of a potential Liberal majority, temporarily suppressed, which could be readily reestablished by outside aid or unusually weak oligarchic, military, or Communist opponents.⁴⁴

At other times in the postwar period, when the United States sought to protect Liberals in the Third World from the "Communist threat," the consequences of Liberal foreign policy on the non-Liberal society often became far removed from the promotion of individual rights or of national security. In Vietnam and elsewhere, intervening against "armed minorities" and "enemies of free enterprise" meant intervening for other armed minorities, some sustaining and sustained by oligarchies, others resting on little more than U.S. foreign aid and troops. Indigenous Liberals simply had too narrow a base of domestic support. These interventions did not advance Liberal rights, and to the extent that they were driven by ideological motives they were not necessary for national security.

To the conservative Liberals, the alternatives are starkly cast: Third World authoritarians with allegiance to the Liberal, capitalist West or "Communists" subject to the totalitarian East (or leftist nationalists, who, even if elected, are but a slippery stepping-stone to totalitarianism).⁴⁵ Conservative Liberals are prepared to support the allied authoritarians. The Communists attack property in addition to liberty, thereby provoking conservative Liberals to covert or overt intervention, or "dollar diplomacy" imperialism. The interventions against Mossadégh in Iran, Arbenz in Guatemala, Allende in Chile, and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua appear to fall into this pattern.⁴⁶ President Reagan's simultane-

⁴³ During the Alliance for Progress era in Latin America, the Kennedy administration supported Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic in 1962. See also William P. Bundy, "Dictatorships and American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 54, 1 (October 1975), pp. 51–60.

⁴⁴ See Samuel Huntington, "Human Rights and American Power," *Commentary* (September 1981), pp. 37–43, and George Quester, "Consensus Lost," *Foreign Policy* 40 (Fall 1980), pp. 18–32, for arguments and examples of the successful export of Liberal institutions in the postwar period. A major study of the role of democratic expansion in U.S. foreign policy is Tony Smith, *America's Mission* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

⁴⁵ Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards." In 1851 the Liberal French historian Guizot made a similar argument in a letter to Gladstone urging that Gladstone appreciate that the despotic government of Naples was the best guarantor of Liberal law and order then available. Reform, in Guizot's view, meant the unleashing of revolutionary violence (Philip Magnus, *Gladstone* [New York: Dutton, 1964], p. 100).

⁴⁶ Richard Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World* (New York: Meridian, 1968), chap. 10; and on Nicaragua, see the *New York Times*, March 11, 1982, for a description of the training direction, and funding (twenty million dollars) of anti-Sandinista guerrillas by the United States.

ous support for the military in El Salvador and guerilla "freedom fighters" in Nicaragua also tracks this pattern, whose common thread is rhetorical commitment to freedom and operational support for conservative, free enterprise.

To the social welfare Liberals, the choice is never so clear. Aware of the need for state action to democratize the distribution of social power and resources, they tend to have more sympathy for social reform. This can produce on the part of "radical" welfare Liberals a more tolerant policy toward the attempts by reforming autocracies to redress inegalitarian distributions of property in the Third World. This more complicated welfare Liberal assessment can itself be a recipe for more extensive intervention. The large number of conservative oligarchs or military bureaucracies with which the conservative Liberal is well at home are not so congenial to the social welfare Liberal, yet the Communists are still seen as enemies of liberty. Left Liberals justify more extensive intervention first to discover, then to sustain Third World social democracy in a political environment that is either barely participatory or highly polarized. Thus Arthur Schlesinger recalls President Kennedy musing shortly after the assassination of Trujillo (former dictator of the Dominican Republic): "There are three possibilities in descending order of preference, a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime [by his followers] or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we can't really renounce the second until we are sure we can avoid the third." Another instance of this approach was President Carter's support for the land reforms in El Salvador, which was explained by one U.S. official in the following analogy: "There is no one more conservative than a small farmer. We're going to be breeding capitalists like rabbits."⁴⁷ President Clinton's administration seems to have succumbed to a similar dose of optimistic interventionism in its conviction that nations could be rebuilt democratically in both Somalia and Haiti, although democracy had never existed in the first and was led in the second by Jean Bertrand Aristide, a charismatic Socialist and an eloquent critic of American imperialism.

The third effect apparent in the international relations of Liberal states is Hume's second assertion: "supine complaisance." This takes two forms: One is a failure to support allies; the other is a failure to oppose enemies.

Where Liberal internationalism among Liberal states has been shortsighted is in preserving its basic preconditions under changing international circumstances, particularly in supporting the Liberal character of its constituent states. The Liberal community of nations has failed on occasion, as it did in regard to Germany in the 1920s, to provide timely international economic support for

⁴⁷ Arthur Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 769, and quoted in Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution*, p. 158. And for the U.S. official's comment on the Salvadoran land reform, see L. Simon and J. Stephen, *El Salvador Land Reform 1980–1981* (Boston: Oxfam-America, 1981), p. 38.

Liberal regimes whose market foundations were in crisis.⁴⁸ It failed in the 1930s to provide military aid or political mediation to Spain, which was challenged by an armed minority, or to Czechoslovakia, which was caught in a dilemma of preserving national security or acknowledging the claims (fostered by Hitler's Germany) of the Sudeten minority to self-determination. Farsighted and constitutive measures seem to have been provided by the Liberal international order only when one Liberal state stood preeminent among the rest, prepared and able to take measures, as did Britain before World War I and the United States following World War II, to sustain economically and politically the foundations of Liberal society beyond its borders. Then measures such as British antislavery and free trade and the U.S. loan to Britain in 1947, the Marshall Plan, NATO, GATT, the IMF, and the liberalization of Germany and Japan helped construct buttresses for the international Liberal order.⁴⁹

Ideologically based policies can also be self-indulgent. Oligarchic or authoritarian allies in the Third World do not find consistent support in a Liberal policy that stresses human rights. Contemporary conservative critics claim that the security needs of these states are neglected, that they fail to obtain military aid or more direct support when they need it (the shah's Iran, Humberto Romero's El Salvador, Somoza's Nicaragua, and South Africa). Equally disturbing from this point of view, Communist regimes are shunned even when a détente with them could further United States strategic interests (Cuba, Angola). Welfare Liberals particularly shun the first group, while laissez-faire Liberals balk at close dealings with the second. In both cases our economic interests or strategic interests are often slighted.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ France and Britain were insisting on prompt payment of wartime reparations, just as the United States was insisting on prompt repayment of wartime loans. The U.S. government formally refused to consider the problem in a comprehensive light. American bankers stepped in, but in light of the needs for financial accommodation, the Dawes and Young plans were helpful but still feeble stopgaps to finance German reparations and Allied debts with lower-interest packages of loans. Two contemporary classics that discuss the problem are Arnold Wolfers, *Britain and France between Two Wars* (1940) and Harold G. Moulton and Leo Pasvolosky, *War Debts and World Prosperity* (1932).

⁴⁹ Kindleberger, *The World in Depression*; Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation*; Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade"; and Fred Hirsch and Michael W. Doyle, "Politicization in the World Economy" in Hirsch, Doyle and Edward Morse, eds. *Alternative to Monetary Disorder* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations/McGraw-Hill, 1977).

⁵⁰ Kirkpatrick points out our neglect of the needs of the authoritarians. Theodore Lowi argues that Democratic and Republican policies toward the acquisition of bases in Spain reflected this dichotomy; "Bases in Spain," in Harold Stein, ed. *American Civil-Military Decisions* (University: University of Alabama Press, 1963), p. 699. In other cases where both the geopolitical and the domestic orientation of a potential neutral might be influenced by U.S. aid, Liberal institutions (representative legislatures) impose delay or public constraints and conditions on diplomacy that allow the Soviet Union to steal a march. Warren Christopher has suggested that this occurred in U.S. relations with Nicaragua in 1979. Warren Christopher, "Ceasefire between the Branches," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1982), p. 998.

A second manifestation of complaisance lies in a reaction to the excesses of interventionism. A mood of frustrated withdrawal affects policy toward strategically and economically important countries. Just as interventionism seems to be the typical failing of the Liberal great power, so complaisance characterizes declined or "not quite risen" Liberal states.⁵¹ Especially following the exhaustion of wars, representative legislatures may become reluctant to undertake international commitments or to fund the military establishment needed to play a geopolitical role. Purely domestic concerns seem to take priority, as they did in the United States in the 1920s and may be doing in the 1990s. Rational incentives for "free riding" on the extended defense commitments of the leader of the Liberal alliance also induce this form of complaisance. During much of the nineteenth century the United States informally relied upon the British fleet for many of its security needs. Today the Europeans and the Japanese, according to some American strategic analysts, fail to bear their "fair" share of alliance burdens.

Liberalism, if we take into account both Kant and Hume, thus carries with it three legacies: peace among Liberals, imprudent vehemence toward non-Liberals, and complaisance toward the future. The first appears to be a special feature associated with Liberalism, and it can be demonstrated statistically. The latter two cannot be shown to be special to Liberalism, though their effects can be illustrated historically in Liberal foreign policy. And the survival and growth in the number of Liberal states suggests that imprudent vehemence and complaisance have not overwhelmed Liberalism's efficacy as form of governance.

THE LOGIC OF A SEPARATE PEACE

How can we explain the legacies of Liberalism on foreign affairs? Perpetual peace, for Kant, is an epistemology, a condition for ethical action, and (most importantly) an explanation of how the "mechanical process of nature visibly exhibits the purposive plan of producing concord among men, even against their will and indeed by means of their very discord."⁵² Understanding history requires an epistemological foundation, for without a teleology, such as the promise of perpetual peace, the complexity of history would overwhelm human

⁵¹ Ideological formulations often accompany these policies. Fear of bolshevism was used to excuse not forming an alliance with the Soviet Union in 1938 against Nazi aggression. And Nazi and fascist regimes were portrayed as defenders of private property and social order. But the connection Liberals draw between domestic tyranny and foreign aggression may also operate in reverse. When the Nazi threat to the survival of Liberal states did require a Liberal alliance with the Soviet Union, Stalin became for a short period the Liberal press's "Uncle Joe."

⁵² Kant, PP, p. 108; UH, pp. 44-45.

understanding.⁵³ But perpetual peace is not merely a heuristic device with which to interpret history. It is guaranteed, Kant explains in "Perpetual Peace" 's "First Addition" ("On the Guarantee of Perpetual Peace"), to result from men fulfilling their ethical duty or, that failing from a hidden plan.⁵⁴ Peace is an ethical duty because only under conditions of peace can all humans treat one another as ends.⁵⁵ For this duty to be practical, Kant needs of course to show that peace is in fact possible. The widespread sentiment of approbation that he saw aroused by the early success of the French revolutionaries showed him that we can indeed be moved by ethical sentiments with a cosmopolitan reach.⁵⁶ This does not mean, however, that perpetual peace is certain ("prophesable"). Even the scientifically regular course of the planets could be changed by a wayward comet's striking them out of orbit. Human freedom requires that we allow for much greater reversals in the course of history. We must in fact anticipate the possibility of backsliding and destructive wars (though these will serve to educate nations to the importance of peace).⁵⁷

But in the end our guarantee of perpetual peace does not rest on ethical conduct, as Kant emphasizes in "Perpetual Peace":

We now come to the essential question regarding the prospect of perpetual peace. What does nature do in relation to the end which man's own reason prescribes to him as a duty, i.e. how does nature help to promote his moral purpose? And how does nature guarantee that what man ought to do by the laws of his freedom (but does not do) will in fact be done through nature's compulsion, without prejudice to the free agency of man? . . . [T]his does not mean that nature imposes on us a duty to do it, for duties can only be imposed by practical reason. On the contrary, nature does it herself, whether we are willing or not: *facta volentem ducunt nolentem tradunt*.⁵⁸

⁵³UH, pp. 51–53.

⁵⁴In the MM Kant seems to write as if perpetual peace were only an epistemological device and perpetual peace, while an ethical duty, empirically merely a "pious hope" (pp. 164–75). (Even here, though, Kant finds that the pacific union is not "impracticable," p. 171.) In the UH, Kant writes as if the brute force of physical nature drives men toward inevitable peace. Yovel (1980) argues that PP reconciles the two views of history, from a postcritical (post-*Critique of Judgment*) perspective (p. 168ff). "Nature" is human-created nature (culture or civilization). Perpetual peace is the "a priori of the a posteriori" (a critical perspective that then enables us to discern causal, probabilistic patterns in history). Law the "political technology" of republican constitutionalism are separate from ethical development. But both interdependently lead to perpetual peace: the first through force, fear, and self-interest, the second through progressive enlightenment, and both together through the widening of the circumstances in which engaging in right conduct poses smaller and smaller burdens.

⁵⁵Kant, UH, p. 50.

⁵⁶Kant, CF, pp. 181–82. This view is defended by Yovel, pp. 153–154.

⁵⁷Kant, UH, pp. 47–48.

⁵⁸Kant, PP, p. 112.

The guarantee thus rests, Kant adds, on the probable behavior not of moral angels but of "devils, so long as they possess understanding."⁵⁹ In explaining the sources of each of the three Definitive Articles of the perpetual peace, Kant then tells us how we (as free and intelligent devils) could be motivated by fear, force, and calculated advantage to undertake a course of actions whose outcome we can reasonably anticipate to be perpetual peace. But while it is possible to conceive of the Kantian road to peace in these terms, Kant himself recognizes and argues that social evolution also makes the conditions of moral behavior less onerous, hence more likely.⁶⁰ In tracing the effects of both political and moral development, he builds an account of why Liberal states do maintain peace among themselves and of how it will (by implication, has) come about that the pacific union will expand. He also explains how these republics would engage in wars with nonrepublics and therefore suffer the "sad experience" of wars that an ethical policy might have avoided.

The first source derives from a political evolution, from a constitutional law. Nature (Providence) has seen to it that human beings can live in all the regions where they have been driven to settle by wars. (Kant, who once taught geography, reports on the Lapps, the Samoyeds, the Peschneras.) "Asocial sociability" draws men together to fulfill needs for security and material welfare as it drives them into conflicts over the distribution and control of social products.⁶¹ This violent natural evolution tends toward the Liberal peace because "asocial sociability" inevitably leads toward republican governments and republican governments are a source of the Liberal peace.

Republican representation and separation of powers are produced because they are the means by which the state is "organized well" to prepare for and meet foreign threats (by unity) and to tame the ambitions of selfish and aggressive individuals (by authority derived from representation, by general laws, and by nondespotic administration).⁶² States that are not organized in this fashion fail. Monarchs thus encourage commerce and private property in order to increase national wealth. They cede rights of representation to their subjects in order to strengthen their political support or to obtain willing grants of tax revenue.⁶³

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Kant, CF, pp. 187–89. See George Kelly, pp. 106–13, for a further explanation.

⁶¹Kant, UH, p. 44–45; PP, pp. 110–11.

⁶²Kant, PP, pp. 112–13.

⁶³Hassner, pp. 583–86. The Kantian pacific union has in fact expanded steadily, but whether we can anticipate its continued expansion much beyond the current numbers of Liberal democracies has been called into question by Samuel Huntington, in "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly* 99 (Summer 1984), pp. 193–218, an issue that he revisits in a more optimistic vein in *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

Kant shows how republics, once established, lead to peaceful relations. He argues that once the aggressive interests of absolutist monarchies are tamed and once the habit of respect for individual rights is ingrained by republican government, wars would appear as the disaster to the people's welfare that he and the other Liberals thought them to be. The fundamental reason is this:

If, as is inevitability the case under this constitution, the consent of the citizens is required to decide whether or not war should be declared, it is very natural that they will have a great hesitation in embarking on so dangerous an enterprise. For this would mean calling down on themselves all the miseries of war, such as doing the fighting themselves, supplying the costs of the war from their own resources, painfully making good the ensuing devastation, and, as the crowning evil, having to take upon themselves a burden of debts which will embitter peace itself and which can never be paid off on account of the constant threat of new wars. But under a constitution where the subject is not a citizen, and which is therefore not republican, it is the simplest thing in the world to go to war. For the head of state is not a fellow citizen, but the owner of the state, and war will not force him to make the slightest sacrifice so far as his banquets, hunts, pleasure palaces and court festivals are concerned. He can thus decide on war, without any significant reason, as a kind of amusement, and unconcernedly leave it to the diplomatic corps (who are always ready for such purposes) to justify the war for the sake of propriety.⁶⁴

These domestic restraints introduce republican caution, Kant's "hesitation," in place of monarchical caprice. Citizens become "co-legislative members" of the state and must therefore give their free consent through representatives not only to the waging of war in general "but also to every particular declaration of war."⁶⁵ Republican caution seems to save republics from the failings Hume saw as characteristic of "enormous monarchies," including "strategic over-extension," court intrigue, and praetorian rebellion.⁶⁶ Representative government allows for a rotation of elites, others have argued, and this encourages a reversal of disastrous policies as electorates punish the party in power with electoral defeat. Legislatures and public opinion further restrain executives from policies that clearly violate the obvious and fundamental interests of the public, as the public perceives those interests.⁶⁷ The division of powers among legislature,

⁶⁴ Kant, PP, p. 100.

⁶⁵ Kant, MM, para. 55, p. 167.

⁶⁶ See the discussion of Hume in footnote 6, above, pp. 347-48.

⁶⁷ For an argument that democracies can both defer to prudent leadership and make prudent judgments, see Kenneth Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 288-97. Joseph Nye concludes that the U.S. record in postwar diplomacy is more mixed, finding that nuclear war has been successfully avoided, but that containing Soviet power and fostering moderation in and by the Soviet Union have been less successful

judiciary, and executive furthermore introduces salutary delay, time for reflection and adjustment in the foreign relations of republican states. In relations with fellow republics these delays are doubly compounded and thus can provide fertile opportunities to resolve disputes short of escalation and armed crisis.

Representation may also provide an effective signaling device, assuring foreign decision makers that democratic commitments are credible because rash acts and exposed bluffs will lead to electoral defeats. Able to make more credible commitments, democracies may thus be less likely to stumble into wars, especially with other democracies.⁶⁸ Tending to confirm this proposition is the observation that alliances among democracies endure longer than alliances among nondemocracies.⁶⁹ But a purely rational-egoist approach to democratic representation also reveals that elected decision makers have a stake in winning wars⁷⁰ and that democracies win 81 percent of the wars in which they are involved; autocracies only 43 percent.⁷¹ This might account for the pattern we observe of many democratic wars but no (or very few) wars against fellow democracies. But if democracies can be rationally rapacious, it does not explain why we do not find more wars in which powerful democracies conquer much weaker democracies, why Luxembourg feels safe from France and Canada safe from the United States. Nor does rational, representative caution actually seem to produce prudence. Liberal publics can become disaffected from international commitments and choose isolationism or appeasement, as Britain and the United States did in the 1920s and 1930s. And republican caution does not end war or ensure that wars are fought only when necessary for national security. Many democratic and representative states have been war-prone, as was classical Athens or would have been Machiavelli's free republics.

If representation alone were peace-inducing, Liberal states would not be warlike or given to imprudent vehemence, as is far from the case. It does ensure that wars are only fought for popular, Liberal purposes. The historical Liberal legacy is laden with popular wars fought to promote freedom, protect private

("Can America Manage Its Soviet Policy?" in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ed., *The Making of America's Soviet Policy* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984], p. 325-29).

⁶⁸ James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of Political Disputes," *American Political Science Review* 88 (1994), pp. 577-92.

⁶⁹ Kurt Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Politics," *International Organization* 50 (1996), pp. 109-39.

⁷⁰ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph Siverson, and Gary Woller find that victory in war reduces risk of leader removal by 25 percent in any year after the victory though increasing casualties by a factor of 10 (measured in battle deaths per 10,000) increases the risk of removal by 8 percent in each year afterward. Victorious initiators are the big winners, greatly reducing the rate of overthrow to about 1 percent from the base level of 10 percent, while victorious targets gain little. See their "War and the Fate of Regimes," *American Political Science Review* 86 (1992), pp. 638-46, and Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders," *American Political Science Review* 89 (1995), pp. 841-55.

⁷¹ Lake, "Powerful Pacifists."

property or support Liberal allies against non-Liberal enemies. Kant's own position is ambiguous. He regards most of these wars as unjust and warns Liberals of their susceptibility to them. At the same time, he argues that each nation "can and ought to" demand that its neighboring nations enter into the pacific union of Liberal states—that is, become republican.⁷² Thus to see how the pacific union removes the occasion of wars among Liberal states and not wars between Liberal and non-Liberal states, we need to shift our attention from constitutional law to international law, Kant's second source.

Complementing the constitutional guarantee of caution, international law adds a second source, a guarantee of respect. The separation of nations that asocial sociability encourages is reinforced by the development of separate languages and religions. These further guarantee a world of separate states, an essential condition needed to avoid a "global, soul-less despotism." At the same time, they also morally integrate Liberal states, for "as culture grows and men gradually move towards greater agreement over their principles, they lead to mutual understanding and peace."⁷³ As republics emerge (the first source) and as culture progresses, an understanding of the legitimate rights of all citizens and of all republics comes into play, and this, now that caution characterizes policy, sets up the moral foundations for the Liberal peace. Correspondingly, international law highlights the importance of Kantian publicity. Domestically, publicity helps ensure that the officials of republics act according to the principles they profess to hold just and according to the interests of the electors they claim to represent. Internationally, free speech and the effective communication of accurate conceptions of the political life of foreign peoples is essential to establish and preserve the understanding on which the guarantee of respect depends.

We can speculate that the process might work something like this: The leaders and publics of domestically just republics, which rest on consent, presume foreign republics to be also consensual, just, and therefore deserving of accommodation. The experience of cooperation helps engender further cooperative behavior when the consequences of state policy are unclear but (potentially) mutually beneficial. At the same time, Liberal states assume that non-Liberal states, which do not rest on free consent, are not just. Because non-Liberal governments are perceived to be in a state of aggression with their own people, their foreign relations become for Liberal governments deeply suspect. Wilhelm II of imperial Germany may or may not have been aggressive (he was certainly idiosyncratic); Liberal democracies such as Britain, France, and the United States, however, assumed that whatever was driving German policy, reliable democratic, constitutional government was not restraining it. They

⁷² Kant, PP, p. 106, p. 102.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 114.

regarded Germany and its actions with severe suspicion, to which the Reich reacted with corresponding distrust. In short, fellow Liberals benefit from a presumption of amity; non-Liberals suffer from a presumption of enmity. Both presumptions may be accurate. Each, however, may also be self-confirming.

Democratic Liberals do not need to assume either that public opinion directly rules foreign policy or that the entire governmental elite is Liberal. It can instead assume a third possibility: that the elite typically manages public affairs but that potentially non-Liberal members of the elite have reason to doubt that anti-Liberal policies would be electorally sustained and endorsed by the majority of the democratic public.

Third and last, cosmopolitan law adds material incentives to moral commitments, for over the long run commitments unsupported by material interests are unlikely to endure. The cosmopolitan right to hospitality permits the "spirit of commerce" sooner or later to take hold of every nation, thus impelling states to promote peace and to try to avert war. Liberal economic theory holds that these cosmopolitan ties derive from a cooperative international division of labor and free trade according to comparative advantage. Each economy is said to be better off than it would have been under autarky; each thus acquires an incentive to avoid policies that would lead the other to break these economic ties. Since keeping open markets rests upon the assumption that the next set of transactions will also be determined by prices rather than coercion, a sense of mutual security is vital to avoid security-motivated searches for economic autarky. Thus avoiding a challenge to another Liberal state's security or even enhancing each other's security by means of alliance naturally follows economic interdependence.

A further cosmopolitan source of Liberal peace is that the international market removes difficult decisions of production and distribution from the direct sphere of state policy. A foreign state thus does not appear directly responsible for these outcomes; states can stand aside from, and to some degree above, these contentious market rivalries and be ready to step in to resolve crises. The interdependence of commerce and the international contacts of state officials help create crosscutting transnational ties that serve as lobbies for mutual accommodation. According to modern Liberal scholars, international financiers and transnational and transgovernmental organizations create interests in favor of accommodation. Moreover, their variety has ensured that no single conflict sours an entire relationship by setting off a spiral of reciprocated retaliation.⁷⁴ Conversely, a sense of suspicion, such as that characterizing relations

⁷⁴ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, chaps. 1 and 2; Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), chap. 9; Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), chap. 7; Richard Neustadt, *Alliance Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); Daniele

between Liberal and non-Liberal governments, can lead to restrictions on the range of contacts between societies. And this can increase the prospect that a single conflict will determine an entire relationship.

Immanuel Kant's 1795 essay "Perpetual Peace" offers a coherent explanation of important regularities in world politics: the tendencies of Liberal states simultaneously to be peace-prone in their relations with one another and unusually war-prone in their relations with non-Liberal states. Republican representation, Liberal respect, and transnational interdependence (to rephrase Kant's three definitive articles of the hypothetical peace treaty he asked states to sign) thus can be seen as three necessary and together sufficient causes of the two regularities. *Thus no single constitutional, international, or cosmopolitan source is alone sufficient, but together (and only together) the three sources plausibly connect the characteristics of Liberal polities and economies with sustained Liberal peace.* Alliances founded on mutual strategic interest among Liberal and non-Liberal states have been broken, economic ties between Liberal and non-Liberal states have proved fragile, but the political bonds of Liberal rights and interests have proved a remarkably firm foundation for mutual nonaggression. A separate peace exists among Liberal states.

But in their relations with non-Liberal states, Liberal states have not escaped from the insecurity of the world political system considered as a whole. Moreover, the very constitutional restraint, international respect for individual rights, and shared commercial interests that establish grounds for peace among Liberal states establish grounds for additional conflict irrespective of actual threats to national security in relations between Liberal and non-Liberal societies.

And in their relations with all states Liberal states have not solved the problems of international cooperation and competition. Liberal publics can become absorbed in domestic issues, and international Liberal respect does not preclude trade rivalries or guarantee farsighted collective solutions to international security and welfare.

TESTING THE LIBERAL PEACE

Liberalism is now widely regarded as having an important connection to international security. The twin propositions—that Liberal democratic republics do not seem to go to war with one another yet seem to be as war-prone as any other regime—are seen as the foundation of the great global changes of our time. The end of the Cold War fits in with the democratization of Russia.⁷⁵

Archibugi, "Immanuel Kant, Cosmopolitan Law, and Peace," *European Journal of International Relations* (1995), pp. 429–56.

⁷⁵ See James Lee Ray and Bruce Russett, "The Future as Arbiter of Theoretical Controversies: Predictions, Explanations, and the End of the Cold War," *British Journal of Political Science* (forthcoming).

And in many local contests, such as the Falklands or Gibraltar, the dampening of once-bitter or violent conflict coincides with the emergence of mutual Liberal democratic respect. The Liberal peace, furthermore, takes on even greater significance as we observe the worldwide spread of democratic forms to every continent and region.

None of this has escaped the politicians. Drawing on Wilsonianism, Roosevelt's Four Freedoms, the Truman Doctrine, and, more recently, addresses by Presidents Reagan and Bush, President Bill Clinton's 1994 State of the Union Address affirmed that "democracies don't attack each other."⁷⁶ "Democratic enlargement" has become the doctrinal centerpiece of the Administration's foreign policy.

But the concern of social scientists is special. That significance was well expressed by Jack Levy who observed a few years ago that "the absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything to an empirical law in international relations."⁷⁷ Liberalism is thus emerging as a powerful paradigm in the social scientific sense. Unusually—for international relations—it is a tested, causal theory. It has a causal argument that can generate lawlike hypotheses capable of being specified in such a way that they can in principle be disconfirmed.

One sign of the health of such a research program is that it attracts serious critical attention. By this measure the "Liberal Democratic Peace" is flourishing. The core association between peace and democracy has been extensively criticized and then defended, in both statistical and case study tests. The literature suggests that we need to pay special attention to three areas. We should elaborate—as a means of testing—the potential outcomes, or dependent variables. We should reexamine the causal model, adopting more careful ways to test it against relevant alternatives. And we should revisit its policy implications.⁷⁸

Elaborate the Dependent Variables. An absence of war is not the same as a state of peace. A state of peace is the expectation that war is not a legitimate or likely recourse. That is what the Liberal model seeks to explain and what Immanuel Kant envisaged in his "Perpetual Peace." A state of peace thus is not the same as successful deterrence. It is a condition that should change expectations and attitudes and give rise to more extensive forms of dispute avoidance

⁷⁶ In the *New York Times*, January 26, 1994.

⁷⁷ Jack Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 653–73.

⁷⁸ These suggestions of course draw on Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs," in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

and international collaboration. This is hard to measure. Recent valuable extensions—I can't name them all—have explored disputes short of war (Bremer); internal violence (Rudolph Rummel); peaceful territorial change (Arie Kacowicz); the effect of electoral cycles (Gaubatz); and great power cooperation (Benjamin Miller).⁷⁹ We should be expanding on the research in political economy, examining whether Liberal ideas, institutions, and interests make a difference in trade, investment, and financial disputes. Liberal institutions, principles, and interests should also provide a firm foundation for international law, leading Liberal states to abide by international law more reliably in dealings with one another than do other pairs of states.

To those areas we should add studies of: defense policies—which way do the weapons point and why?—intelligence cooperation—do liberals resist better the temptation to engage in covert activity (was the recent squabble with France the norm or an exception)?—foreign aid—is there a “democratic difference” of discriminating in favor of fellow democracies? Liberal democracy should make some difference over and beyond war. Does it?

Causal Argument and Testing.⁸⁰ One additional reason to expand our view of potential outcomes is (I suspect) that our current statistical tests of the “democratic peace” are full of false positives and false negatives. False negatives (absolving Liberalism) arise from the fact that there are many reasons not to go to war other than Liberalism. Distance, exhaustion, and deterrence resulting from an expectation that one will lose or that the costs of victory are too high are some of the obvious candidates. False positives (condemning Liberalism) arise from the circumstance that it is not at all clear that most lists of participating polities, including my own, are all Liberal republics. Many or some of the “democratic” conflicts and disputes may be among participatory polities but not among “Liberal republics.”

Kant's theory held that a stable expectation of peace among states would be achieved once three conditions were met. We can rephrase them as:

1. *Representative, republican government.* This includes an elected legislature, separation of powers, and the rule of law. Kant argued that together those institutional features lead to caution because the government is responsible to

⁷⁹ Stuart Bremer, “Democracy and Militarized International Disputes, 1816–1965,” *International Interactions* 18, 3 (1992), pp. 23–50; Rudolph Rummel, *Death by Government* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994); Arie Kacowicz, *Peaceful Territorial Change* (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1994); Kurt Gaubatz, “Election Cycles and War,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (1991); and Benjamin Miller, *When Opponents Cooperate* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).

⁸⁰ I would like to thank George Downs and Bruce Russett for their valuable advice on this section.

its citizens. This does not guarantee peace. It should select only those wars that the citizens will support.

2. *A principled respect for nondiscriminatory human rights.* This should produce a commitment to respect the rights of fellow Liberal republics (because they represent free citizens, who as individuals have rights that deserve our respect) and a suspicion of nonrepublics (because if those governments cannot trust their own citizens, what should lead us to trust them?)⁸¹

3. *Social and economic interdependence.* Trade and social interaction generally engender a mix of conflict and cooperation. Liberalism produces special material incentives for cooperation. Among fellow Liberals interdependence should not be subject to security-motivated restrictions and consequently tends to be more varied, less dependent on single issues, and less subject to single conflicts.⁸²

Kant suggests that each principle is necessary and that together they are sufficient to establish a secure expectation of peace. The first principle specifies representative government responsible to a winning electoral coalition of voters; the second and third specify the coalition's ends and interests. Together the three generate an expectation of peaceful accommodation among fellow Liberals and hostility toward non-Liberals.

Not all participatory polities would meet Kant's criteria. Kant distrusted unfettered, democratic majoritarianism, and his argument offers no support for a claim that all participatory polities—democracies—should be peaceful either in general or between fellow democracies. Many participatory polities have been non-Liberal. For two thousand years before the modern age, popular rule was widely associated with aggressiveness (by Thucydides) or imperial success (Machiavelli). Today a list of Kantian republics would not include, for example, institutionalized representative democracies that are motivated by a public culture of indiscriminate empire mongering or racism or ethnic purity. The decisive preference of their median voter might well include “ethnic cleansing” against other democratic polities. Nor would they include autocracies, however enlightened and Liberal, because the autocrats are not constrained by representative legislatures and the rule of law.⁸³ Their rule would not generate a

⁸¹ The individual subjects of autocracies of course do not lose their rights. It's just that the autocrats cannot claim legitimately to speak for their subjects. Subjects retain basic human rights, such as the rights of noncombatants in war. The terror bombing of civilians—as in the bombings of Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki—constitute, in this view, violations of these rights and of Liberal principles and demonstrate weaknesses of Liberal models in these cases.

⁸² These three points are all developed above in “Liberal Legacies.”

⁸³ Kant himself had a weakness for seeing pacific potential in some enlightened despots, a point drawn to my attention by Dr. Dominique Leydet. Kant appears to hope that enlight-

strable expectation of Liberal respect. Nor would they include autarkic democracies that lack the material and social foundations of interdependent interests that can generate mutual knowledge and egoistic incentives in support of moral commitments.⁸⁴

How to weed out the false positives? One way is a better data set of Liberal polities that excludes non-Liberal republics, which may be generating cases of the "inter-Liberal" conflict. How to weed out the false negatives, where the Liberal model may be getting undue credit for peace? Distinguishing Liberal peace from peace by non-Liberal means calls for process-tracing case studies and comparisons that weigh the Liberal model against non-Liberal theories of a similar scope.

Hard Cases

The Liberal peace is full of difficult cases. The collection of existing states cannot readily be sorted along a simple dichotomy: Liberal versus non-Liberal. In individual cases, passions and political and economic interests work against the pacifying tendencies of the Liberal peace.

Imperial Germany. This is a case of complicated identification. Not only was the Reichstag elected by universal male suffrage, but by and large, the state ruled under the law, respecting the civic equality and rights of its citizens. Moreover, Chancellor Bismarck began the creation of a social welfare society that served as an inspiration for similar reforms in Liberal regimes. However, the constitutional relations between the imperial executive and the representative legislature were sufficiently complex that various practices, rather than constitutional design, determined the actual relation between the government and the citizenry. The emperor appointed and could dismiss the chancellor. Although the chancellor was responsible to the Reichstag, a defeat in the Reichstag did not remove him, nor did the government absolutely depend on the Reichstag for budgetary authority. In practice Germany was a Liberal state under republican law for domestic issues. But the emperor's direct authority over the army, the army's effective independence from the minimal authority of the War Ministry, and the emperor's active role in foreign affairs (including the influential separate channel to the emperor through the military attachés) together with the tenuous constitutional relationship between the chancellor and the Reichstag made imperial Germany a state divorced from the control of its citizenry in foreign affairs.

ened despots will begin the process of establishing peace, even if despotic governments cannot sustain a secure peace.

⁸⁴Kant's is a testable proposition. All three may not be necessary, and we might be able to develop a more parsimonious theory of democratic peace than the one he offers. But it appears to be the case in the modern period that there is a strong tendency for stable democracies to be Liberal and interdependent.

This authoritarian element not only influenced German foreign policy making but also shaped the international political environment (a lack of trust) the Reich faced and the domestic political environment that defined the government's options and capabilities (the weakness of Liberal opinion as against the exceptional influence of Junker militaristic nationalism). Thus direct influence on policy was but one result of the authoritarian element. Nonetheless, significant and strife-generating episodes can be directly attributed to this element. They include Tirpitz's approach to Wilhelm II to obtain the latter's sanction for a veto of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg's proposals for a naval agreement with Britain (1909). Added to this were Wilhelm's personal assurances of full support to the Austrians early in the Sarajevo crisis and his erratic pressure together with Moltke's on the chancellor throughout July and August 1914. These factors helped destroy whatever coherence German diplomacy might otherwise have had and led one Austrian official to ask, "Who rules in Berlin? Moltke or Bethmann?"⁸⁵

British Nonintervention in the U.S. Civil War. Here liberal pacification was tested in a demanding manner.⁸⁶ The Civil War, which broke out in 1861, constituted not an easy but a difficult case for British Liberals. Southern propagandists (such as Hotze) working in London advertised the Southern cause as a war for self-determination, for the rights of small nations, for free trade against Northern tariffs, and for (incongruously and perhaps in appeal to British Conservatives) an aristocratic way of life as against the crass industrial democracy of the North.⁸⁷ Liberals, including even Gladstone and Russell, leaned South. Prime Minister Palmerston was cautious and looked for Southern victories to establish effective independence. Napoleon III, seeking Southern support for his adventure in Mexico, lobbied Britain for recognition.

Both the British constitutional state and its trading interest thus seemed to lean South. Public opinion was divided, with the elite generally pro-South and the radicals pro-North. Lincoln brilliantly turned the tide, however, and averted European recognition of the South with his Emancipation Proclamation in 1863. Cynics taunted the North Americans for only freeing the slaves they could not reach.⁸⁸ But the proclamation slowly at first, then with a gathering

⁸⁵Gordon Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. xxviii and chap. 6. For an excellent account of Bethmann's aims and the constraints he encountered, see Konrad H. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," *Central European History* 2 (1969).

⁸⁶This case and the British-American War of 1812 are examined by John Owen, who insightfully emphasizes the importance of perceptions.

⁸⁷James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 548.

⁸⁸The proclamation applied only to the states currently in rebellion and did not affect slaves held in the occupied border states.

tide mobilized the mass of Liberal middle-class and working-class support for the Union cause, leading young Henry Adams to enthuse: "The Emancipation Proclamation has done more for us here than all our former victories and all our diplomacy."⁸⁹

The Fashoda Crisis of 1898. Here we can see the opposite: how popular passion worked against peace and against constitutional and economic interest.⁹⁰ Indeed, according to some scholars, passions, colonial uncertainty, and a long history of rivalry overwhelmed Liberal restraint and peace was rescued by the balance power.⁹¹

In 1893, 1894, and 1896 France sent expeditionary missions to the Sudan. Angered by having been dropped from the former Anglo-French condominium over Egypt when Britain intervened in 1882 and established sole control, the French Colonial Ministry was determined to grasp the upper Nile and perhaps obtain a stranglehold on North Africa all the way from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, slicing the equally ambitious (and fanciful) British ambitions of "Cape to Cairo" at the "waist." Unlike the earlier efforts, Marchand's 1896 expedition survived and reached the Nile in 1898. Meanwhile, fearing a French plot to dam and control the Nile, the British responded by sending Kitchener south from Egypt in a bloody campaign against the Mahdist forces that had expelled Egypt from the suzerainty it had long claimed over the Sudan. Kitchener met Marchand at Fashoda, and the crisis began.⁹²

The crisis was greatly complicated by the hazy legal status of the Sudan and Britain's very indirect claim (through Egypt's claim) over it. The French regarded the region as *terra nullius* (we would say it belonged to the Sudanese). On the other hand, the crisis was greatly simplified by Britain's overwhelming military superiority—both locally (Marchand depended on Kitchener for supplies) and at sea.

⁸⁹ McPherson, p. 567.

⁹⁰ My views of this case have been greatly influenced by an excellent paper written by Ms. Hongying Wang, "Liberal Peace? A Study of the Fashoda Crisis of 1898" (American Political Science Association, 1992).

⁹¹ See the article by Christopher Layne, discussed below, and Erik Yesson, "Power and Diplomacy in World Politics" (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Politics, Princeton University, 1992). Other difficulties for the liberal thesis are raised by Hongying Wang, "Liberal Peace?" But for a contrast favoring Liberal explanations over Realist in the Fashoda and Spanish-American War crises, see James Lee Ray, "Comparing the Fashoda Crisis and the Spanish American War," International Studies Association, American Political Science Association, March 1994.

⁹² Valuable sources on the incident include Darrell Bates, *The Fashoda Incident of 1898: Encounter on the Nile* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); G. N. Sanderson, *England, Europe, and the Upper Nile* (Edinburgh: 1965); Roger Brown, *Fashoda Reconsidered: The Impact of Domestic Politics on French Policy in Africa* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1970); Christopher Andrew, *Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale* (London: Macmillan, 1968); and R. Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War*.

Contrary to Liberal expectations, war soon loomed on the horizon. Britain mobilized its fleet. The French right and its press demanded firmness. The British Tory-Unionist and Liberal-Imperialist factions demanded French withdrawal. The jingoist press on both sides called for standing firm. Although no one wanted war, neither seemed at first willing to back down.

The crisis was, however, eventually resolved through Liberal politics (but also with very good fortune). The good fortune, from the Liberal Anglo-French point of view, was simply the long-standing and widely shared French hostility to Germany. This hostility, reflecting the German conquest of Alsace-Lorraine, had not been strong enough to stand in the way of Franco-German colonial cooperation against Britain in the 1880s, but the prospect of going to war against Britain with only Germany as a potential ally was not a prospect that most of the French, elite or mass, appeared to welcome.

Also leaning against the war were three more directly Liberal internationalist factors. The elected leadership of both countries was decidedly "bourgeois Liberal" (if "bourgeois" can be used to describe the Marquess of Salisbury). Antijingoist, deeply concerned about political stability, hostile to the moods of mass democracy, imbued with the cosmopolitan culture of Europe, seeking to cultivate the growing economic interdependence of the two economies, both Salisbury and the French foreign minister, Théophile Delcassé, sought a close understanding between the two neighbors. Very importantly, throughout the crisis the French ambassador to London (Courcel) and Delcassé appeared to believe that Salisbury was doing everything he could to avoid war and that although he could not say so in public, he would be prepared to accommodate France elsewhere (in Morocco) after the crisis was resolved by a French withdrawal.⁹³ The Liberal press—the *Manchester Guardian* and the radical pro-Dreyfusard press in France—was thoroughly opposed to escalating the crisis. And the business elite on both sides of the Channel were appalled at the idea of war.⁹⁴

In the end the two appear to have been very close to war. Indeed, without French resentment of Germany's conquest of Alsace-Lorraine, there might have been war. On the other hand, if the Sudan had been clearly delimited territory, there is little indication that the two sides would have felt themselves to have been so firmly in the right. Colonial disputes between Liberals elsewhere were resolved through negotiation. Both geopolitical and Liberal forces rescued the two from war.

⁹³ At the same time the French were told that Queen Victoria was also urging moderation on Salisbury and the cabinet. See Courcel to Delcassé, October 29, 1898, no. 465, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents diplomatiques français*, 1st Série, Tome XIV (Paris: 1957), pp. 731, 751.

⁹⁴ See William Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism* (New York: Knopf, 1951), pp. 552–53; Lebow (1981), p. 322; and Bates, pp. 154–55.

Covert Actions. The Liberal peace depends on accurate publicity. Both citizens and leaders need to be informed and the former needs to know what the latter is doing. But in covert actions this link is broken.⁹⁵ For example, in the early 1950s Jacobo Arbenz led a democratizing movement that sought to improve the lot of the poor worker in Guatemala's banana plantations and to increase popular participation in politics. He met with hostility from the large U.S. business firms, including United Fruit, which questioned his labor policies. When the dispute escalated to the point that the Arbenz government nationalized the plantations of United Fruit, the U.S. companies mobilized the efforts of the CIA against Guatemala, alleging that Arbenz was an agent of the Soviet bloc. Influenced by the companies and determined to avert "communism" in Central America, the Eisenhower administration began to plan for the armed overthrow of the Arbenz government. Engaging disaffected military officers and mobilizing a collection of subversive dirty tricks, the CIA succeeded in ousting Arbenz in 1954 and installing the pro-U.S. regime of Colonel Carlos Castillo-Armas. The Arbenz regime was far from an established Liberal democracy; it was, however, much closer to democratic and Liberal principles than the regime with which the United States replaced it.⁹⁶ The American public knew little more than the Cold War propaganda orchestrated by United Fruit and its corporate allies, which painted Arbenz as a Soviet agent and kept the public uninformed about U.S. subversion.⁹⁷

Unfortunately, despite major advances in public disclosure and constitutional control, the CIA still engages in operations inimical to the stability and spread of a Liberal peace. In 1995 the French government revealed a CIA attempt to bribe its trade negotiators, and in March 1995 it was revealed the CIA had kept information concerning its continued support for Guatemalan military intelligence and death squads secret from not only the public but also the U.S. State Department, which had assured the public that such links had ended.⁹⁸

The Logic of Critical Cases. Recent research has offered a valuable exploration of similarly hard cases, where war nearly occurred; others have deepened the Liberal paradigm by showing how the process of the Liberal peace might

⁹⁵For an analysis of the problem, see Stansfield Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy* (1985), p. 179, and Harold Koh, *The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power after the Iran-Contra Affair* (1990) and a general discussion of constitutional control in Lori Damrosch, "Constitutional Control over War-Powers: A Common Core Accountability in Democratic Societies," *University of Miami Law Review* 50, pp. 801-19.

⁹⁶It should be noted that Arbenz later acknowledged that he was and had been a communist at heart.

⁹⁷For a good brief account, see Barnett, *Intervention and Revolution*, pp. 229-36, and for U.S. policy making, see Richard Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala*.

⁹⁸Sam Dillon and Tim Weiner, "In Guatemala's Dark Heart, CIA Lent Succor to Death," *New York Times*, April 2, 1995.

have worked. Together these illustrate the progressive development of the Liberal research program.

One critic chose his cases as episodes when supposed liberals came close to war.⁹⁹ In the Venezuela dispute between the United States and the United Kingdom in 1895, the conflict over the Ruhr in 1936, and the Fashoda crisis of 1898 the logic of power seemed to replace the Liberal logic of accommodation. At the minimum the disputes should succeed in warning Liberals of the dangers of imperial pursuits of principled settlements (the Venezuelan dispute), unprincipled and punitive peace settlements (the Ruhr crisis), and the contest over undefined colonial assets (Fashoda).

While these cases serve as valuable warnings, they are not as effective as tests of the Liberal theory. A theory is a coherent causal relation that presents a possible causal explanation of an outcome or set of outcomes (formulated as hypotheses) that in principle can be disconfirmed by evidence. A case study can serve, as can statistical tests, either to confirm or to disconfirm theories. Most political theories, moreover, need process-testing case studies to determine whether the allegedly determining factors in a relationship were perceived by the actors. But case studies designed to test a theory should be selected not by the dependent variable (in this case peace or war) as one does when one seeks out near wars, but according to the independent variables—liberal republics and non-Liberal states. Hard cases are not the best tests of anything but iron laws. (Most advocates of Liberal theory took the trouble to point out exceptions to the peace proneness of Liberal republics or democracies.)

Moreover, when Liberals do get into hostile crises (militarized international disputes), they have already suffered a failure even if war does not result. The Liberal failure precedes the crisis. One of the most important signs of Liberalism at work will be not the war crises resolved but the issues and crises that did not arise. Kant focused on a state of peace distinguishing Liberal relations from the state of war characterizing Liberal-non-Liberal and non-Liberal-non-Liberal relations. Kant of course was drawing on Hobbes's famous Realist description of international relations not as war but as a state of war, which is "a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known." "For," Hobbes continues, "as the nature of foul weather, lieth not in a shower or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many days together: so the nature of war, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary." War and peace are thus merely indicators of the "states" that permit them. States of peace are distinguished from states of war when judicial processes, not coercive bargaining, settle disputes and when third parties are trusted to mediate con-

⁹⁹Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant," *International Security* (Fall 1994), pp 5-49.

flicts.¹⁰⁰ Liberals do hope to have a backup mechanism, Liberal respect that precludes war even in crises, but relying on this backup unrealistically tempts human passions.

We can also use case studies to probe when Liberal politicians might be abusing Liberal principles to promote personal or ideological agendas.¹⁰¹ Liberal intellectuals and leaders have interpreted political regimes in a biased fashion. Double standards abound. Left-wing Liberals have found democratic mandates in revolutionary dictatorships; Stalin became, briefly, "Uncle Joe." Right-wing Liberals have found Liberal potential in anti-Communist, capitalist dictatorships.¹⁰² If the Liberal peace rested on enlightened Liberal intellectuals alone, its salience would presumably be much less. Constraining leaders, however, and contributing to the public reliability of the peaceful expectation are institutions of representative government and material interests that can control individual biases. Each of three Kantian conditions can be conceived of as a potential backup to each of the others. The system can allow for an occasional imperialist or racist or ethnocentric or simply erratic leader, provided his or her success and tenure in office rest on a calculation of what the interests of the represented majority will bear. Similarly, mass racism or ethnocentrism can be temporarily mitigated by Liberal statesmanship or commercial interests.

When it comes to testing the validity of the Liberal peace, therefore, we need to measure regimes better than some of the actual democratic leaders do, if only to identify where they may have made an error, mistaking favored or "like" regimes for "liberal" ones. This is because ideologies are not the only source of the peace and because we shall want to discover where their particular ideologies may have led them astray. Intersubjective measures play a particularly useful check on subjective interpretation in this connection since they go beyond the views of a single intellectual, leader, or country.¹⁰³ It may be the case that the Liberal peace is systematically misinterpreted and spurious and that it really is instead a "Teutonic," "Aryan," or "Anglo-Saxon"—or today "capitalist"—condominium resulting from "Anglo-Saxon" virtue or simple profit mongering, as

¹⁰⁰ For example, Anne Marie Slaughter Burley has shown the differing treatments accorded to Liberal and non-Liberal states in American courts and William Dixon has examined the management of conflict prior to the outbreak of a crisis. See Anne Marie Slaughter Burley, "Law among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine," *Columbia Law Review* 92 (1992), pp. 1907–96; and William Dixon, "Democracy and the Management of Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, 1 (March 1993), pp. 42–68.

¹⁰¹ Ido Oren, "The 'Democratic Peace' or Peace among 'Our Kind'?", *International Security* 20, 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 147–84.

¹⁰² Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies," pp. 327–28.

¹⁰³ For example, the proportion of the citizenry that can vote; the proportion of the society open to international trade, investment, and travel; the degree of control exercised by the legislature over public decisions, including foreign affairs; the condition of personal and civic rights and the attitudes of the citizenry on questions of human rights all can be studied intersubjectively, and should be. My list of Liberal regimes is a very rough approximation of such a measure.

some of the politicians and intellectuals of earlier and current times may have thought or think. The best way to find out is to test the counterproposition. Is there any evidence that the "Teutons" hang together? Have the capitalists?

If the Liberal thesis is anything like normal social science, we shall discover exceptions, inter-Liberal wars or inter-Liberal crises, with some of the latter resolved by luck (from the Liberal view) rather than by principled respect, institutional restraint, and commercial interest. In many other instances, Liberals suggest that differences will be managed long before they become violent disputes in the public arena. Rather than our writing case after case of non-events, however, this is where the utility of statistically testing the significance of the liberal thesis will make itself clear.

A fairer test, for example, would select a small random sample of Liberal dyads, Liberal–non-Liberal dyads, and non-Liberal dyads and examine whether the Liberal thesis holds. To test the Liberal thesis on decision making, moreover, we will need a wider investigation than is typical of conventional diplomatic history or than is provided by me of the cases discussed above. We shall want to trace decision processes outside cabinets, through parliaments and pressure groups and to, sometimes, the public. We should look for distinctions between informed and uninformed publics (often aroused by crises), axiomatic and articulated assumptions,¹⁰⁴ and issues on or absent from the policy agenda.

Statistical Assessment

What is the correct statistical test of the international political significance of Liberalism? The ideal test would probe whether a Liberal state, replacing a non-Liberal state, would in its relations with other Liberals and non-Liberals behave the same way in the same circumstances for as long as would have a continuation of the original non-Liberal state—and vice versa. Such a proposition is not readily testable. We can control for contiguity, income, etc. across an entire sample,¹⁰⁵ but not for all those factors at once, together with geopolitical position. This is a key neglect; international history has been described as "geography in motion."¹⁰⁶ We will need to settle for something less. One (still-incomplete) test that would be interesting would be to compare for each country its war experience during its Liberal periods with that during non-Liberal periods.¹⁰⁷ History also provides its own test during world wars, when states are

¹⁰⁴ Ernest May, *Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).

¹⁰⁵ Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Alliance, Contiguity, Wealth and Political Stability: Is the Lack of Conflict among Democracies a Statistical Artifact?", *International Interactions* 17, 3 (1992), pp. 245–68.

¹⁰⁶ I have heard the tag most often from Robert Gilpin.

¹⁰⁷ This is the strategy employed by John Owen in the *International Security* 20 (Fall 1995) collection.

forced to choose on which side of an impending conflict they will fight; interestingly, Liberals tend to wind up on the same side (with a few anomalies).

Can we rely on statistical data sets for anomalies? Finland's formal status as a belligerent of the Allies in World War II is driving much of the recent statistical differences. Ruling Finland out by the thousand battle deaths criterion of Singer and Small is a useful statistical convenience but does not resolve the issue.¹⁰⁸ If today the United States and Britain suddenly attacked each other and stopped before sustaining one thousand casualties, no advocate of the Liberal thesis should regard the theory as vindicated. Here is where we need careful case studies. A good place to begin would be Allied and Nazi relations with Finland. Was Finland regarded as an enemy by the Allies and, if so, in a way similar to how the other enemy states were regarded? If yes, then this should be regarded as a disconfirming case; if not, not.

Once we have identified the best criteria to construct data sets, there is a key role for statistical assessment. An article by Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa presents a valuable contribution to a more refined statistical testing of the "democratic peace" proposition. Drawing on evidence from 1816 to 1980,¹⁰⁹ they confirm the three major propositions: that "democracies" are as likely as any other regime to get into war, that they are significantly less likely to go to war with one another, and that they are less likely to get into militarized disputes with one another.¹¹⁰ (The authors follow much of the literature in including all participatory polities irrespective of whether they are Liberal or not.)

The authors then proceed to segment the dependent variable—both war and dispute data—into five periods: "1) pre-World War I (1816–1913); 2) World War I (1914–18); 3) the interwar years (1919–38); 4) World War II (1939–45); and post-World War II (1946–80)."¹¹¹ Doing so, they discover that before 1914, although democratic states were less likely to engage in war with one another, this result is no longer statistically significant (it could have occurred by

¹⁰⁸ J. David Singer and Melvin Small, *Resort to Arms* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982).

¹⁰⁹ Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Politics and Peace," *International Security* 20, 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 108–32.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 119, 121. The authors are raising issues that should concern Liberals. Even if democracies get into fewer disputes, why democracies get into militarized disputes at all is a problem worth more attention. Perhaps they are more commercially interdependent—and thus have more to dispute about? Their disputatiousness may also be an ironic product of their success in avoiding war; militarized signaling may be employed simply because neither party assumes real war will result. Thus the Anglo-Icelandic Cod War, one of the most serious Liberal disputes of the Cold War period, which involved naval intimidation and bumping and may have resulted in a casualty, could have been a product of the assumption that the dispute would never go as far as real war. In this respect it resembles perhaps the bumping games (constrained by nuclear deterrence) that U.S. and Soviet submarines played during the Cold War.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

chance). (The democratic probability of war is lower in every period but World War II, but the relationship is statistically powerful only during World War I and the Cold War.) Moreover, democratic states before World War I are more, not less, likely to get into low-level disputes with one another than are nondemocratic states with other nondemocratic states. (Democratic states are less likely to get into disputes in every period but the pre-1914 period, but only the period of World War II and the Cold War are statistically significant.) The results are interesting.

The reasons for segmenting the data, however, are less clear. Segmenting the data in that fashion makes no more sense than picking a random set of decades or half centuries, unless one is testing the democratic or Liberal model against some other model. It is worth paying some attention to their justifications.

The authors offer two reasons for breaking up the data set of democratic peace and war. First, they note that general wars such as World War I and World War II are different from dyadic wars. These wars are seen to involve systemic effects and attempts to "pass the buck" that operate over and above dyad-specific or domestic regime effects.¹¹² This may be so, but if so, these periods of general war should constitute an especially difficult time for Liberal cooperation. General systemic wars constitute especially severe tests of dyadic conceptions of war as states are pressured to choose sides on strategic alliance criteria ("the enemy of my enemy is my friend") rather than regime criteria. In World War II this produced the well-known anomaly of the formal state of war existing between the Liberal Allies and Liberal Finland, because Finland was an enemy of the non-Liberal Soviet Union, which was allied to the United States and Britain. Nonetheless, Liberal logic should resist systemic logic and hold up here. Why exclude those challenges?

A second reason offered for separating pre-World War I data from post-World War II data is unspecified differences in "processes underlying alliance formation [and] war outbreak," on the one hand, and "bipolarity and nuclear weapons," on the other. First, it is of course just these processes that we seek to test; what is the alternative set of processes? Second, one could and should test the Liberal or democratic model against other theories such as international structure—bipolarity and multipolarity, nuclear or conventional weapons. Indeed there have been—so far—no wars between atomic or nuclear-armed powers.¹¹³ Nuclear deterrence thus might account for peace among the United

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 114.

¹¹³ Kenneth Waltz has elaborated the reasons for nuclear peace in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, *The spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate* (New York: Norton, 1955). One exception to the nuclear peace might be the battles in 1969 between the USSR and the People's Republic of China along the Ussuri River Border. But casualty figures are uncertain in that conflict, and so was the status of China's deliverable nuclear weapons.

States, Britain, and France in the Cold War, and it widens the argument to incorporate U.S.-Soviet relations. Does it also account for fewer militarized disputes and as extensive cooperation? Doesn't it leave unaccounted for the preatomic peace among Liberal republics. More promisingly, do multipolar alliances perhaps generate interallied strife, and bipolar alliances interallied peace? Perhaps common security interests are stronger in alliances in bipolar systems, or perhaps the bipolar hegemon preserve the peace by policing the weaker allies. It would be worth testing whether bipolar peace is the true underlying cause of the peace among democracies in the U.S. bloc of the Cold War—and, presumably, an equivalent peace among Communist republics in the Soviet bloc?

None of the measures captures the temporal or institutionalized dimension of the Liberal peace. Liberalism claims to avert not merely war in any given year but any war among Liberal states as long as they are Liberal. It looks to the probability not that war was avoided by Britain and France in 1898 but that it was avoided continuously for as long as they both were Liberal. If we multiply the probabilities in each given year to find the joint probability over almost two hundred years, the probability that the Liberal peace is a statistical accident becomes remarkably small (2 preceded by a decimal point and twenty zeros, in Bruce Russett's calculation).¹¹⁴ Wars, however, are not independent events. War in one year makes war in the next likely, as peace connects to peace, so the statistical measure is suspect. But not measuring the joint probability is equally suspect because it is that very jointness that is the essence of the Liberal claim.

The data, moreover, on democratic war and democratic disputes could just as well be a product of measurement error (the participatory polities were not Liberal) or uncontrolled factors—greater commerce, perhaps, among democracies. Interdependence is a source both of conflict and, for Liberals (by argument), of peace. If one controls for commerce, does the relationship between democracies and disputes change?¹¹⁵ Or, perhaps, the pre-1900 disputatiousness of democracies is due to the incompleteness of Liberal democracy in the earlier era when the franchise was limited (*inter alia*, women were denied the franchise) and democratic principles were new. The best we can do is test theoretical models against each other. Until we have an alternative model, segmenting the data does not produce meaningful results.

¹¹⁴ Bruce Russett, "The Democratic Peace—and yet It Moves," *International Security* 19, 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164–75.

¹¹⁵ John Oneal, Frances Oneal, Zeev Maoz, and Bruce Russett in "The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy and International Conflict, 1950–1985," *Journal of Peace Research* (February 1996), pp. 11–28, examine these questions and find that both interdependence and democracy contribute to peace.

Alternatives?

Some have suggested that the United States abandon the pursuit of democratic enlargement and instead recognize that states in fact pursue "common interests" over "common polities."¹¹⁶ But "common interests" do not constitute an alternative model. The debate is not about whether states pursue their interests; it is about how to define and judge the interests of states. Realists (of a Structural persuasion) see those interests in terms of the balance of power; Liberals, in terms of Liberal accommodation; Marxists in terms of class warfare and solidarity. When we have to choose, is democratization a better long-term strategy for the United States than enhancing our position in the balance of power? It is over choices such as these that the debate should continue.

In the end, as with most theoretical disputes, the debate will turn on the alternatives. Liberal theory should not be compared with the statistical residual, a richly described case study, or "History" but with the comparative validity of other theories of similar scope. To do this, we need disconfirmable versions of the two other leading modern candidates, Realism and Marxism, which is in part the aim of this book.

FOREIGN POLICY DILEMMAS

Even if our answer favors democratization, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder have warned us that democratization is not enough.¹¹⁷ Given all the instabilities of regime change, democratization may provoke more war. Their statistical analysis has recently been challenged, and the evidence is still in dispute.¹¹⁸ But if Mansfield and Snyder are correct, Liberals have little to be surprised about, but much to worry about. Without Liberal principles and international interdependence, all of which take time, democratizing regimes may well be war-prone.

We have here a useful warning. Yet in the long run liberalization across nations seems to hold great promise. How does one get from here to there? Golden parachutes for ex-dictators and the military are one idea with a considerable history that may contribute to at least short-run stability.¹¹⁹ Extending international institutions, or enhancing them, may be another answer.¹²⁰ Can

¹¹⁶ Farber and Gowa (1995), p. 122.

¹¹⁷ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20, 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5–38.

¹¹⁸ Andrew Enterline, "Driving while Democratizing: A Rejoinder to Mansfield and Snyder," *International Security* 20, 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 183–207.

¹¹⁹ Mansfield and Snyder, p. 6.

¹²⁰ See Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," *International Security* 14, 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 5–41.

the promise of European Union membership and the presence of assistance and association be an institutional bridge over a difficult transition? Can similar institutional mechanisms become operative in Africa and Asia? These are well worth our attention.

Preserving the legacy of the Liberal peace without succumbing to the legacies of Liberal imprudence has proven to be both a moral and a strategic challenge. The bipolar structure of the international system and the near certainty of mutual devastation resulting from a nuclear war between the superpowers has created a "crystal ball effect" that has helped constrain the tendency toward miscalculation present at the outbreak of so many wars in the past.¹²¹ But this "nuclear peace" appears to be limited to the superpowers. It has not curbed military interventions in the Third World. Moreover, it is subject to a desperate technological race designed to overcome its constraints and to crises that have pushed even the superpowers to the brink of war. We must still reckon with the imprudent vehemence and moods of complaisant appeasement that have almost alternately swept Liberal democracies.

Yet restraining Liberal imprudence, whether aggressive or passive, may not be possible without threatening Liberal pacification. Improving the strategic acumen of our foreign policy calls for introducing steadier strategic calculations of the long-run national interest and more flexible responses to changes in the international political environment. Constraining the indiscriminate meddling of our foreign interventions calls for a deeper appreciation of the "particularism of history, culture, and membership."¹²² But both the improvement in strategy and the constraint on intervention in turn seem to require an executive freed from the restraints of a representative legislature in the management of foreign policy and a political culture indifferent to the universal rights of individuals. These in their turn could break the chain of constitutional guarantees, the respect for representative government, and the web of transnational contact that have sustained the pacific union of Liberal states.

Liberalism at the twentieth century's end looks remarkably robust. Ironically, so it did at the beginning. If nothing else, we should have learned something about peace, war, and cooperation from our very bloody twentieth century. We have paid a high tuition; let us hope we have learned that Liberal democracy is worth defending. The promise of peace may well be one more reason for doing so.

¹²¹ Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus* XCIII (Summer 1964), pp. 881–909, and Albert Carnesale, Paul Doty, Stanley Hoffmann, Samuel Huntington, Joseph Nye, and Scott Sagan, *Living with Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Bantam, 1983), p. 44.

¹²² Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 5.

Conclusion: Liberals and Realists: Explaining Differences

LIKE THE REALISTS, Liberals display significant differences. The institutionalists (Locke and Bentham) focus on individual-level (Image I) determinants, the commercialists (Smith and Schumpeter) on societal-level (Image II), and the internationalists (Kant) on interstate (Image III) determinants of the state of war. Their conceptions of what describes the state of war also differ. For none of the Liberals does the state of nature (without government) produce the state of war; for each the state of war must be made known by aggressive acts or declared intentions to aggress. For all the Liberals—unlike the Realists—there exists the more or less firm possibility of a state of peace.

For Locke and Bentham, the state of peace is easily corrupted by the inconveniences of prejudiced and partial judgment, misinformation, and uncertainty; and the state of war and state of peace begin to merge. Individual citizens and statespersons whose perceptions and interest can corrupt peace can, if they are dedicated to the rule of law, defend the rights of life, liberty, and property and achieve a measure of international justice. They are, however, often likely to fail and may only succeed in preserving the security of their state.

For Smith and Schumpeter the state of war can be tamed by the development of commercial society or capitalist democracy, which rationalize and align individual interests with social interests through markets. The state of war is a product of autocratic imperialism and export monopolism, social formations that are atavistic after the process of free market capitalism has begun to take root. Indeed, it is the development of the market economy that in the long run will ensure that the warlike forces of traditional autocracies will evolve into extinction.

For the Kantian internationalists, the state of war is a potent structural force